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MANUFACTURED DEADLOCKS? THE 
PROBLEMATIC “BAD FAITH DEFENSE” TO 
FORCED SALES OF DELAWARE 
CORPORATIONS UNDER SECTION 226 OF THE 
DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 
Abstract: Title 8, Section 226 of the Delaware General Corporation Law au-
thorizes courts to force the sale of Delaware corporations when the stockhold-
ers or directors are in a state of complete deadlock. Some courts have tenta-
tively acknowledged that a party may successfully oppose the sale by arguing 
that the stockholder bringing a Section 226 action has done so in bad faith by 
manufacturing a deadlock in the hopes of obtaining a court-ordered sale (i.e., 
the “bad faith defense”). This Note explores the idea of the manufactured 
deadlock in Section 226 actions, through the lens of Shawe v. Elting, a recent, 
highly publicized case where the Delaware Chancery Court ordered the sale of 
a profitable company against the wishes of a 50% owner. There exist inherent 
problems in attempting to determine whether an ostensible deadlock between 
business owners is authentic or manufactured. An examination of cases grap-
pling with deadlock in business dissolution actions, which are analogous to 
those brought under Section 226, highlights these issues. In light of the fun-
damental difficulties in determining whether a deadlock is legitimate or fabri-
cated, courts should move towards rejecting the legitimacy of the “bad faith 
defense” to court-ordered sales entirely. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1992, Philip Shawe and Elizabeth Elting co-founded TransPerfect 
Global, Inc. while attending the New York University Stern School of Busi-
ness.1 Notwithstanding the tensions arising out of their personal relation-
ship, the corporation flourished over the subsequent decade from a “dorm 
room start-up to a major player in the global market for translation ser-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152, 156 (Del. 2017); In re Shawe & Elting LLC, C.A. No. 
9661-CB, C.A. No. 9686-CB, C.A. No. 9700-CB, C.A. No. 10449-CB, 2015 WL 4874733, at *3 
(Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015), aff’d, Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152 (Del. 2017). This dispute in its 
entirety (including both the lower court and appellate actions) is referred to throughout the text of 
this Note as the “TransPerfect case.” See infra notes 2–174 and accompanying text. The Chancery 
Court Order of August 13, 2015, will be cited as “In re Shaw” in the footnotes and the Delaware 
Supreme Court opinion will be cited as “Shawe v. Elting.” See infra notes 2–174 and accompany-
ing text. 
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vices.”2 In 2007 they incorporated TransPerfect in Delaware as part of a 
company-wide reorganization.3 In recent years, TransPerfect has achieved 
staggering profitable growth, recognizing in 2014, for example, revenues 
exceeding $470 million and a net income of $78.9 million.4 Despite the 
corporation’s considerable success, Shawe and Elting’s relationship began 
to deteriorate in 2011, and eventually became so hostile that in May 2014, 
Shawe and Elting filed a total of four individual lawsuits against one anoth-
er.5 Of the four separate actions filed, one has since gained national atten-
tion: Elting’s petition in the Delaware Chancery Court seeking an appoint-
ment of a custodian under Title 8, Section 226(a)(2) of the Delaware Gen-
eral Corporation Law to sell the corporation as a whole.6 
                                                                                                                           
 2 See In re Shawe, 2015 WL 4874733, at *3. Shawe and Elting were engaged in 1996 but 
ended their personal relationship in 1997. See id. According to Elting, Shawe was thoroughly 
upset by the breakup and would “say horrendous things” about the man that Elting subsequently 
married in 1999. See id. 
 3 See id. Along with translation services, TransPerfect offers website localization and litiga-
tion support services and employs over 3500 people. See Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d at 156. Shawe 
and Elting incorporated TransPerfect as a Subchapter S corporation, which allowed for certain 
income tax benefits—specifically, the ability for income not to be taxed at the corporate level. See 
26 U.S.C. § 1361 (2012) (defining Subchapter S corporations); In re Shawe, 2015 WL 4874733, at 
*3. There are 100 shares of common stock of the corporation issued and outstanding. In re Shawe, 
2015 WL 4874733, at *3. Elting owns (and has owned since the corporation’s founding) fifty shares, 
and Shawe has owned forty-nine shares, with Shawe’s mother, Shirley Shawe, owning the last re-
maining share. See Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d at 156. For all intents and purposes, Shawe and Elting 
are each viewed (and treated by the Chancery Court) as 50% owners despite the fact that technically 
speaking, Shawe is only a 49% owner. See In re Shawe, 2015 WL 4874733. at *1. This is so be-
cause Shawe’s mother has essentially pledged to vote in tandem with Shawe on all issues. Id. This 
point will become relevant in the pages that follow discussing Elting’s petition filed under Title 8, 
Section 226 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226 (2011) 
(authorizing the appointment of a custodian or receiver for deadlocked corporations with more than 
one stockholder). See generally In re Shawe, 2015 WL 4874733 (assessing Elting’s petition for the 
appointment of a custodian). Elting originally filed a petition for dissolution under Title 6, Section 
273, a joint venture dissolution statue that governs court-ordered dissolutions of corporations with 
only two stockholders. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 273 (authorizing the dissolution of corporations 
with only two 50% stockholders); In re Shawe, 2015 WL 4874733 n.7. As noted by the Chancery 
Court in the TransPerfect case, Elting eventually dropped that action, recognizing that because there 
are technically three stockholders, Section 273 did not apply, and instead pursued the appointment of 
a custodian under Section 226. In re Shawe, 2015 WL 4874733 n.7. 
 4 See In re Shawe, 2015 WL 4874733, at *4. 
 5 Id. at *18. At trial, the Chancery Court in In re Shawe examined the breakdown of Shawe 
and Elting’s interpersonal relationship in “painstaking detail” and the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
opinion reiterated a few examples of the toxic nature of their relationship: Shawe engaged in a 
“secret campaign to spy on Elting,” seeking to have Elting criminally prosecuted, and disparaged 
Elting by disseminating a memorandum to company employees and issuing a press release con-
taining “false and misleading information.” See Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d at 156–57; In re Shawe, 
2015 WL 4874733, at *2, *27. 
 6 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226; In re Shaw, 2015 WL 4874733, at *18; Fred Lucas, Judicial 
Overreach: Small Court, Big Economic Ramifications, TOWNHALL (May 27, 2016), https://townhall.
com/columnists/fredlucas/2016/05/27/judicial-overreach-small-court-big-economic-ramifications-
n2169449 [https://perma.cc/6VF5-MXC4] (arguing that Chancellor Bouchard’s decision to appoint 
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Title 8, Section 226 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (“Sec-
tion 226”) permits courts, under extreme circumstances, to intervene in the 
affairs of corporations, with the goal of resolving managerial deadlocks and 
saving those companies from irreparable harm.7 Specifically, Section 226 
permits the Chancery Court to appoint a receiver or custodian for a corpora-
tion when (1) the “stockholders are so divided” that they cannot elect direc-
tors; (2) the directors are in such a state of deadlock that they are unable to 
make managerial decisions and the corporation is thus faced with “irrepara-
ble” harm; or (3) when the corporation has “abandoned its business” pur-
pose and failed to adequately dissolve itself.8 The statute also gives the 
Chancery Court discretion in determining what authority to give the ap-
pointed custodian or receiver.9 The Chancery Court may use Section 226 to 
appoint a custodian to act as a “tie breaking” director in order to resolve 
deadlocks between directors.10 The Chancery Court has also used Section 
226 to give the appointed custodian the power to sell a corporation when it 
is insolvent in order to protect the business from incurring additional debts 
and causing further financial damage.11 As such, the Chancery Court sur-
prised the Delaware business community when it used Section 226 to ap-
point a custodian with the power to sell TransPerfect, Inc., despite the fact 
that the company was and remains profitable.12 As discussed in greater de-
                                                                                                                           
a custodian to sell TransPerfect constitutes “judicial overreach,” in light of the corporation’s high 
profits and thousands of employees). Elting’s petition seeking a court-ordered sale of the corpora-
tion, and the Chancery Court’s decision to order the sale, not only solicited attention from report-
ers, but also drew the ire of business interest groups and politicians. See infra notes 14–16 and 
accompanying text. 
 7 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a)(2). 
 8 See id. § (a)(1)–(3). The reader should note that the first clause of the statute explains that if 
any of subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) are satisfied, then the court may appoint one or more 
custodians, and that if the corporation is insolvent, that the court may appoint one or more receiv-
ers. See id. § 226(a). This differentiation (between the appointment of a custodian and a receiver) 
signals the legislature’s recognition that in some circumstances, the statute may require the court 
to intervene in the affairs of solvent companies. See In re Shaw, 2015 WL 4874733, at *28 n.293. 
Because this Note concerns only judicial intervention in the affairs of a solvent, and profitable 
company, the discussion of Section 226 contained herein will refer only to the statute’s authoriza-
tion of court-appointed custodians. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a). 
 9 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(b) (stating that the custodian shall have the authority to 
continue the business of the corporation “except when the Court shall otherwise order”). 
 10 See id. § 226; In re Shawe, 2015 WL 4874733, at *31. 
 11 See In re Shawe, 2015 WL 4874733, at *1, *31 (inferring that in the usual course of events, 
a custodian is appointed to sell a corporation because the corporation is insolvent or is losing capi-
tal). 
 12 See Lucas, supra note 6 (arguing that the decision to appoint a custodian to sell the 
TransPerfect constitutes “judicial overreach”). Some viewed the decision as one that could set a 
dangerous precedent for the laws governing corporations in Delaware, especially considering the 
state’s reputation as a business-friendly locale. See infra notes 14–15 and accompanying text; see 
also Karl Baker, Delaware May Finally Be Done with TransPerfect Feud, DEL. ONLINE (Nov. 21, 
2017), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/money/business/2017/11/21/delaware-may-finally-
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tail below, the public outcry did not deter the Delaware Supreme Court from 
issuing an unwavering opinion in February 2017 affirming the Chancery 
Court’s order and heavy-handedly rejecting Shawe’s argument on appeal 
that the Chancery Court had exceeded its statutory authority.13 
The controversial decision in TransPerfect placed Section 226 in the 
national spotlight, soliciting considerable media attention and even served 
as a debate topic in Delaware’s 2016 gubernatorial race.14 Employees of 
TransPerfect, calling themselves “Citizens for a Pro Business Delaware”, 
filed a petition with the Delaware Supreme Court arguing that the Chancery 
Court’s contentious decision not only placed their jobs at risk, but also 
threatened to tarnish the state of Delaware’s reputation as the “gold stand-
ard” for corporate law.15 To be sure, much of the media attention surround-
ing the Chancery Court’s decision, and the arguments dealt with by the Su-
preme Court on appeal, focused on whether the Chancery Court over-
stepped its bounds in using Section 226 to force the sale of a profitable 
company against the objections of a 50% stockholder.16 Though the Dela-
ware Supreme Court confidently rejected Shawe’s argument that the Chan-
cery Court’s decision posed a harrowing threat to Delaware business law, 
the draconian concerns of judicial overreach, which permeated Shawe’s 
appellate briefs, were echoed in the form of public protest by third parties.17 
                                                                                                                           
done-transperfect-feud/884363001/ [https://perma.cc/S248-DP6T] (noting that “many observers 
were shocked” by the Chancery Court’s decision to force a sale of the company). 
 13 See generally Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152 (affirming the Chancery Court’s decision to 
appoint a custodian with the power to sell the corporation). Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court 
explicitly stated that the Chancery Court’s decision “was supported by the facts found after trial, 
was permitted by the statute, and thus was not an abuse of discretion.” See id. at 160. 
 14 Jeff Murdock, Supreme Court Decision a Loss for TransPerfect Workers, DEL. ONLINE 
(Oct. 20, 2016), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/money/2016/10/18/transperfect-workers-
motion-support-appeal-denied/92349636/ [https://perma.cc/KEJ5-5CCF] (discussing the lawsuit 
filed by TransPerfect employees in response to the Chancery Court’s decision to appoint a custo-
dian to sell the company, and noting that the controversial decision earned a seat at the table as a 
debate topic in the Delaware race for governor). 
 15 See id. The reader should note that the concern voiced by Citizens for a Pro-Business Del-
aware that the decision in the TransPerfect case will render them “jobless” may not be valid; in-
deed, it may well be that following the closing of an impending sale, the majority of the employ-
ees will be left in place to continue operating the company. See id. Nonetheless, it is not difficult 
to imagine, given Delaware’s reputation as a business-friendly state, why other owners of the 
countless businesses subject to Delaware law, might share the concerns voiced by the Citizens for 
a Pro Business Delaware regarding judicial overreach. See id. (noting that the heated debate at the 
heart of the TransPerfect case was “closely watched among businesses incorporated in Dela-
ware”). 
 16 Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d at 155 (noting that on appeal, Shawe argued that the Chancery 
Court “exceeded its statutory authority” by forcing the sale of a “solvent company”); see Lucas, 
supra note 6 (noting the argument that a forced sale of a profitable business constitutes “judicial 
overreach”). 
 17 Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d at 160 (noting that the Chancery Court’s decision to use Section 
226 to appoint a custodian with the power to sell TransPerfect was not an abuse of the court’s 
2018] Bad Faith Should Not Be a Defense in § 226 Actions 729 
Less attention, however, has been given to the implications of a subsidiary 
issue raised by the TransPerfect case: the extent to which, in applying Sec-
tion 226, courts should consider the “bad faith defense” to judicial interven-
tion.18 
On occasion, courts have denied petitions for judicial intervention in 
cases where the respondent has been able to demonstrate that the director 
(or stockholder) seeking intervention has done so in bad faith by manufac-
turing a deadlock with the ultimate goal of securing a forced sale of the 
company.19 As such, the bad faith defense to a petition for judicial interven-
tion seeks to demonstrate that a director or stockholder has manufactured a 
“phony” deadlock or has sought to give the appearance of a deadlock by 
refusing to agree to any business decisions in order to pursue a court-
ordered sale.20 In the TransPerfect case, Shawe raised this defense, arguing 
that Elting actively refused to agree to any business decision so that she 
could subsequently convince the Chancery Court that she and Shawe were 
in such a state of deadlock that the appointment of a custodian, with the 
power to sell under Section 226, was warranted.21 Said another way, Shawe 
alleged that the apparent deadlock between he and Elting was not genuine, 
but that Elting had manufactured the deadlock in order to pursue her ulti-
mate exit strategy of seeking a forced sale of the corporation under Section 
226.22 
                                                                                                                           
discretion); Opening Brief for Appellant at 1, Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152 (Del. 2017) (No. 
423, 2016); Murdock, supra note 14 (discussing the lawsuit filed by TransPerfect employees). 
 18 See Millien v. Popescu, C.A. No. 8670–VCN, 2014 WL 656651, at *2 n.17 (Del. Ch. Feb. 19, 
2014) (describing the idea of a manufactured deadlock in the context of a Section 226 action). This 
Note uses the term “bad faith defense” in relation to Section 226 actions to refer to the same phe-
nomenon articulated by Peter Mahler in his explanation of the “bad faith defense” in relation to busi-
ness dissolution proceedings in New York: as a defense that a respondent seeks to oppose court-
ordered dissolution (or, as in the TransPerfect case, to oppose a court-ordered sale) by arguing that 
the petitioner has manufactured a deadlock. See Peter Mahler, Is Bad Faith a Defense in Business 
Divorce Proceedings?, FARRELL FRITZ: N.Y. BUS. DIVORCE (Sept. 16, 2013), https://www.ny
businessdivorce.com/2013/09/articles/deadlock/is-bad-faith-a-defense-to-deadlock-dissolution-
petition/ [https://perma.cc/5TKU-XZ9D] (discussing the bad faith defense in relation to New 
York’s Business Corporation Law, Section 1104-a). 
 19 Millien, 2014 WL 656651, at *2 n.17 (describing the idea of a manufactured deadlock in 
the context of a Section 226 action). 
 20 See id.; see also Vila v. BVWebTies LLC, C.A. No. 4308-VCS, 2010 WL 3866098, at *7 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2010) (describing the bad faith defense to judicial dissolution in the context of 
LLCs, though holding that the petitioner had not manufactured a deadlock in bad faith). 
 21 In re Shaw, 2015 WL 4874733, at *28. 
 22 See id.; see also Mahler, supra note 18 (citing Section 1104-a of New York’s Business 
Corporation Law in stating that the case law preventing minority shareholders from engaging in 
acts made in bad faith undertaken with the goal of forcing an involuntary dissolution is clear, but 
that the New York case law regarding the so-called bad faith defense as it pertains to 50% share-
holders is “uncertain” and “sporadic[c]”). The bad faith defense also arises in the context of LLCs. 
See Peter Mahler, Bad Faith Defense Gets Boost in LLC Dissolution Case, FARRELL FRITZ: N.Y. 
BUS. DIVORCE (Sept. 19, 2016) https://www.nybusinessdivorce.com/2016/09/articles/dissolution-
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This Note explores the phenomenon of the bad faith defense as applied 
to Section 226 petitions, and the difficulty in determining whether a dead-
lock between directors is genuine, or whether it has been “manufactured” as 
a long-term strategy in order to achieve a forced sale.23 This Note does not 
endeavor to critique the Chancery Court’s decision nor the Supreme Court’s 
subsequent affirmation in the TransPerfect case, but rather uses the 
TransPerfect case to contextualize the thorny issues raised by the bad faith 
defense (i.e., the difficulty of asking a court to inquire into a director’s sub-
jective and underlying motivations for pursuing a forced sale under Section 
226).24 Part I of this Note provides the requisite background information 
necessary to conceptualize the bad faith defense by detailing the require-
ments laid out in Section 226 and describes how the Chancery Court ap-
plied Section 226 in the TransPerfect case.25 Part II of this Note discusses 
how courts in both Delaware and foreign jurisdictions have interpreted and 
applied the bad faith defense in analogous dissolution proceedings and 
highlights the inherent difficulties in assessing the defense.26 Part III of this 
Note discusses that although the Delaware Chancery Court has expressly 
considered the bad faith defense in a number of actions brought under Title 
8, Section 273 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (the “joint venture 
                                                                                                                           
defenses/bad-faith-defense-gets-boost-llc-dissolution-case/ [https://perma.cc/M27G-EKSW] (dis-
cussing the notion that the bad faith defense has “osmosed” into LLC dissolution cases, and dis-
cussing Wilford v. Coltea, No. 15-856-BC (Tenn. Ch. Ct. 20th Dist. May 16, 2016), a Tennessee 
business court case where the court applied Delaware LLC law to allegations that a 50% owner of 
an LLC had manufactured a deadlock in order to seek a forced dissolution). 
 23 See Mahler, supra note 18 (discussing the bad faith defense to business dissolution actions 
under New York law); see also Millien, 2014 WL 656651, at *2 n.17 (describing the idea of a 
manufactured deadlock in the context of a Section 226 action); Vila, 2010 WL 3866098, at *7 
(finding that a deadlock in an LLC dissolution case had not been manufactured). 
 24 See infra notes 29–174 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 29–77 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 78–123 and accompanying text. The reader should note that the bad faith de-
fense is not tied directly to other notions of good or bad “faith” seen elsewhere in corporate law. See 
Peter Mahler, Unraveling the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: Guest Post by 
Professor Daniel Kleinberger, FARRELL FRITZ: N.Y. BUS. DIVORCE (Nov. 30, 2015), https://www.
nybusinessdivorce.com/2015/11/articles/delaware/unraveling-the-implied-covenant-of-good-faith-
and-fair-dealing-guest-post-by-professor-daniel-kleinberger/ [https://perma.cc/RW9H-3Y49] (dis-
cussing the differences between the various types of “good faith” claims, and distinguishing, for 
example, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing from the corporate law “Caremark” 
good faith claims); see also Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market for LLC Law: A Theory of 
Contractibility and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 244–47 (2011) (noting the often-
confused distinction between the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the fiduciary 
duty of good faith in the LLC context). For the purpose of this Note, the bad faith defense refers 
only to allegations made by a respondent in a Section 226 or Section 18-802 action governed by 
Delaware law—that the petitioner has improperly manufactured dissension and deadlock as a 
long-term litigation strategy in order to convince a court to order the appointment of a custodian 
(or dissolution, in the case of a Section 273 or Section 18-802 action). See In re Shaw, 2015 WL 
4874733, at *28; Mahler, supra note 18. 
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dissolution statute”) and Title 6, Section 18-802 (the “LLC dissolution stat-
ute”), it has rarely taken an explicit position on the bad faith defense’s via-
bility in Section 226 actions.27 Finally, it argues that because of the inherent 
difficulty in subscribing to a clear formula to assess the deadlock, coupled 
with the inexorable reality that, manufactured or not, a deadlock is still a 
deadlock, the best way for courts to deal with the bad faith defense going 
forward might be to embrace a wholesale rejection of the defense’s legiti-
macy.28 
I. THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 226 AND ITS APPLICATION  
IN THE TRANSPERFECT CASE 
A. The Underlying Requirements of Section 226—What Findings  
Warrant the Appointment of a Custodian? 
Section 226 sets forth three instances in which the Chancery Court has 
the power to appoint a custodian, two of which are relevant to this Note.29 
The first, set out in Section 226(a)(1), permits the court to appoint a custo-
dian for a solvent corporation when the stockholders are “so divided” that 
they are unable to elect successors to fill director positions.30 The second, 
laid out in Section 226(a)(2), solicits a markedly more involved analysis.31 
This subsection requires three conjunctive preconditions for a court ap-
pointment of a custodian: (i) the directors of the corporation are deadlocked 
with respect to managerial decisions such that a vote required for “curative 
action” by the board of directors cannot be obtained; (ii) the corporation’s 
                                                                                                                           
 27 See infra notes 124–174 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 124–174 and accompanying text. The reader should note that although this 
Note specifically argues in favor of rejecting the availability of the bad faith defense in Section 
226 actions, the arguments in favor of doing so also apply to the (somewhat) analogous corpo-
rate/LLC dissolution provisions found under Sections 273 and 18-802 of the Delaware General 
Corporation Law, respectively. See infra notes 124–174 and accompanying text. As is explained 
in footnote 174 of this Note, as a practical matter, it might be easier for courts to justify their re-
jection of the bad faith defense in Section 226 actions despite the reality that the courts have, with 
some degree of regularity, both implicitly and explicitly accepted and grappled with the defense in 
Section 273 and Section 18-802 cases, given that there is very little precedent dealing with the bad 
faith defense in Section 226 cases specifically. See Millien, 2014 WL 656651, at *2 n.17. This 
Note will conclude by arguing that policy arguments in favor of abandoning the bad faith defense 
in corporate dissolution cases are somewhat analogous to the reasoning that led to the shift away 
from fault to no-fault divorce statutes. See Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Con-
tract, Opportunistic Violence, and Other Bad Arguments for Fault Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 
719, 719, 721–25 (describing the shift to a no-fault divorce system and rejecting claims that no-
fault divorce regimes have contributed to “societal-ills”). 
 29 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a) (2011). 
 30 Id. § 226(a)(1). 
 31 Id. § 226(a)(2). Section 226(a)(2) requires a more rigorous analysis given the multipart 
inquiry that it solicits, as compared to Section 226(a)(1), which asks only one question. See id. 
§ 226(a)(1)–(2). 
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business is suffering or is threatened with irreparable injury; and (iii) the 
stockholders are unable to terminate the deadlock by way of a stockholder 
vote.32 The Chancery Court’s final order in the TransPerfect case dedicates 
the bulk of its analysis to reconciling the facts of the case with the three 
preconditions set forth in Section 226(a)(2).33 It is worth noting that a 
court’s finding that the requirements of any subsection of Section 226(a) 
have been satisfied does not trigger a mandatory duty to appoint a custodi-
an.34 The introductory phrase to Section 226(a) states that upon the satisfac-
tion of any of the three following provisions under Section 226(a), a court 
may appoint a custodian, indicating that such an appointment is “not man-
datory.”35 
The language set forth by subsection (b) of Section 226 is that which 
ultimately lies at the crux of the ongoing dispute in the TransPerfect case.36 
In effect, Section 226(b) is instructive on the powers granted to a custodian, 
whose appointment the Chancery Court has deemed necessary through ap-
plication of Section 226(a).37 This subsection states, in pertinent part, that 
said custodian has the duty to “continue the business” of the company and 
shall not “liquidate its affairs and distribute its assets” unless the court so 
orders.38 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See id. § 226(a)(2). See generally Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., 449 A.2d 232 (Del. 1982) 
(describing the preconditions that must be met in order for a court to determine that the appoint-
ment of a custodian is permitted under Section 226). 
 33 In re Shawe & Elting LLC, C.A. No. 9661-CB, C.A. No. 9686-CB, C.A. No. 9700-CB, 
C.A. No. 10449-CB, 2015 WL 4874733, at *26–30 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015) (citing DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a)), aff’d, Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152 (Del. 2017). The third scenario, laid out 
in Section 226(a)(3), allows the court to appoint a custodian when the corporation has “abandoned its 
business” and has subsequently failed to take adequate measures to “dissolve, liquidate, or distribute 
its assets.” See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a)(3). 
 34 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 226(a)–(b); In re Shaw, 2015 WL 4874733, at *30 n.313 
(citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a)). 
 35 In re Shaw, 2015 WL 4874733, at *30. When a court finds that the facts of a case meet any 
of the three scenarios set out in Section 226(a), and subsequently uses its discretionary authority to 
appoint a custodian, the analysis then proceeds under Section 226(b) to determine what the custodian 
has the power to do. See id. 
 36 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(b); In re Shaw, 2015 WL 4874733, at *30. 
 37 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a)–(b). 
 38 See id. § 226(b). The factors or circumstances that motivate the court to exercise its discretion 
to appoint a custodian in the first place will intrinsically be instructive in appropriately determining 
the role of the custodian. See In re Shaw, 2015 WL 4874733, at *30; see also Miller v. Miller, C.A. 
No. 2140–VCN, 2009 WL 554920, at *4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2009) (detailing the considerations 
that may inform a court’s decision to exercise its discretion to appoint a custodian under Section 
226(a), and suggesting that such considerations are intrinsically linked to the limits imposed on 
the custodian’s authority under Sections 226(b)). For example, in the TransPerfect case, the Chan-
cery Court noted that the goal of “remedying an injustice” first bears on the court’s decision as to 
whether or not to exercise its discretion to appoint a custodian, and also informs the court’s parame-
ters for the custodian’s role or authority. See In re Shaw, 2015 WL 4874733, at *30 (citing Miller, 
2009 WL 554920, at *4). Notably, regarding the question of the custodian’s authority, the Chancery 
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B. Section 226(a) as Applied to the Facts of TransPerfect 
The Delaware Chancery Court’s analysis in the TransPerfect case illus-
trates the operation of Section 226 in practice.39 The court’s initial task was 
to shoehorn the nature of the dispute between Elting and Shawe, the co-
owners, into one of the scenarios set out in Section 226(a).40 First, the court 
held that the requirements of Section 226(a)(1) were satisfied by pointing to 
the corporation’s bylaws, which provide for a three-member board.41 The 
court noted that Shawe and Elting have served as the corporation’s only two 
directors since it was formed in 2007, and that the third director-seat has 
consistently remained vacant.42 In December 2014, the parties eventually 
stipulated that they were unable to fill the empty seat and also failed to elect 
successors to Elting and Shawe, whose terms had expired.43 As such, the 
court summarily held that Section 226(a)(1) was “plainly” satisfied.44 
Both the Chancery Court and the Delaware Supreme Court dedicated 
considerable more attention to the analysis of whether or not the require-
ments of Section 226(a)(2) had been satisfied.45 As further examined below, 
                                                                                                                           
Court has explicitly stated that upon appointment, the custodian’s powers should be “tailored as nar-
rowly as possible.” See Miller, 2009 WL 554920, at *4. 
 39 See In re Shaw, 2015 WL 4874733, at *26–30. 
 40 See id. at *26 (beginning the analysis by detailing the requirements of § 226(a)(1)). 
 41 See id. (finding § 226(a)(1) satisfied). 
 42 See id. In September 2014, Elting brought an action to hold an annual meeting in order to 
officially elect directors of TransPerfect. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (2011) (vesting share-
holders of Delaware corporations with the right to file an action demanding that the corporation 
hold an annual meeting for the purpose of electing members to the board of directors); In re Shaw, 
2015 WL 4874733, at *26. 
 43 In re Shaw, 2015 WL 4874733, at *26. 
 44 Id. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court agreed, noting in particular that Shawe did not 
specifically object to the Chancery Court’s finding that a custodian could be appointed under Sec-
tion 226(a)(1). See Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152, 161 (Del. 2017). The Delaware Supreme Court 
reiterated that Shawe acquiesced to the fact that Section 226(a)(1) was satisfied in its subsequent 
discussion of Section 226(a)(2) by arguing that as a threshold matter, Shawe’s argument that Sec-
tion 226(a)(2) does not apply is “academic,” given that he agreed that Section 226(a)(1) was satis-
fied. See id. The reader may, however, consider approaching the Delaware Supreme Court’s char-
acterization of this issue with some skepticism, as the counter to that argument would be that 
Shawe’s argument that Section 226(a)(2) does not apply (even though Section 226(a)(1) does) is 
far from academic and is highly relevant, given that the degree of authority that the court bestows 
upon a custodian under Section 226(b) is dependent on the court’s analysis under Section 226(a). 
See Miller, 2009 WL 554920, at *4 (detailing the considerations that may inform a court’s deci-
sion to exercise its discretion to appoint a custodian under Section 226(a), and suggesting that 
such considerations are intrinsically linked to the limits imposed on custodians under Section 
226(b)). Indeed, a finding that only Section 226(a)(1) was satisfied and not Section 226(a)(2) as 
well might lead to the appointment of a custodian with only the power to act as a tie-breaking 
director, and not the power to sell the company outright. See id. 
 45 See Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d at 161; In re Shawe, 2015 WL 4874733, at *28. In addition 
to petitioning for the appointment of a custodian with the power to sell the corporation under Sec-
tion 226, Elting also argued, in the alternative, for the court to exercise its discretion and grant 
“equitable dissolution” outside the bounds of the statute, but the Chancery Court declined to enter-
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a thorough discussion of the applicability of Section 226(a)(2) is necessary 
in order to ultimately grant the custodian sweeping power to act as an auc-
tioneer.46 Section 226(a)(2) sets forth three necessary conditions that must 
be found in order for a court to implement authority thereunder.47 
First and foremost, there must be a finding that the directors of the 
corporation are in a state of deadlock.48 The Chancery Court reasoned that 
this first condition of Section 226(a)(2) was unequivocally satisfied.49 In 
fact, the court stated that Shawe and Elting were in a state of deadlock with 
respect to “several matters of critical importance to the Company.”50 The 
court identified a number of points of disagreement, each of which lent cre-
dence to an overall indicia of deadlock between Shawe and Elting.51 
The court first pointed to the fact that, as evinced by the record, Shawe 
and Elting had been consistently incapable of reaching an agreement on the 
issue of “non-tax distributions.”52 After noting Shawe’s disagreement with 
Elting’s distribution strategy, the court forcefully stated that by persistently 
refusing to agree to a distribution scheme, Shawe had effectively used the 
fact that Elting needs his consent to implement distributions as “leverage” 
over Elting.53 This kind of leverage, the court stated, is indicative of the 
                                                                                                                           
tain that option, finding that Elting had not successfully demonstrated that Shawe had breached a 
duty to the corporation or engaged in the kind of self-interested actions necessary to show the kind 
of aggressive misconduct that equitable dissolution requires. In re Shaw, 2015 WL 4874733, at 
*33–34. 
 46 In re Shaw, 2015 WL 4874733, at *26, *31 (stating that such a grant of power should be an 
act of “last resort”). 
 47 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a)(2). 
 48 See id.; Hoban v. Dardanella Elec. Corp., No. 7615, 1984 WL 8221, *1 (Del. Ch. June 12, 
1984) (explaining that in order for a court to conclude that a deadlock between a corporation’s 
directors exists, the directors must be “so divided respecting the management of the affairs of the 
corporation that the required vote for action by the board of directors cannot be obtained”). 
 49 In re Shaw, 2015 WL 4874733, at *26 (noting that “the requirements of this statute plainly 
have been met”). 
 50 See id. 
 51 See id. at *26–27 (listing various disputes between Shawe and Elting regarding the compa-
ny). 
 52 See id. As noted by the court, the corporation had, for the majority of its history, made 
distributions to the stockholders in order to make up for both Shawe and Elting’s tax liabilities 
arising out of the income that they each respectively derived from the corporation. See id. at *26 
n.285. That “seemingly simple” practice became problematic and resulted in considerable contro-
versy between Shawe and Elting in 2013 when Shawe attempted to pay a portion of the $21 mil-
lion dollars due in taxes from capital held by the LLC, which Elting absolutely opposed. See id. 
Elting had expressed an interest in having the amount of non-tax distributions paid to her and 
Shawe increase in conjunction with increases in the corporation’s profits. See id. at *26. Elting 
wanted the corporation to pay regular non-tax distributions to her and Shawe, which could be 
based on EBITDA or “some other performance based metric.” See id. 
 53 Id. at *26 (detailing the areas of disagreement between Shawe and Elting). 
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“mutual hostaging” that has, over the past two years, come to be the hall-
mark of Shawe and Elting’s business relationship.54 
The second point of contention that the court relied on in order to justi-
fy its conclusion was Shawe and Elting’s inability to agree on the corpora-
tion’s acquisition opportunities and “true ups.”55 Elting had consistently 
opposed Shawe’s desire to pursue acquisitions for the corporation by rea-
soning that she distrusts Shawe, and that additional acquisitions would in-
crease her investment with Shawe.56 With respect to Shawe and Elting’s 
disagreements over “true-ups,” the court noted that the corporation had his-
torically performed an accounting to square both Elting’s and Shawe’s re-
spective use of the corporation’s funds, and that by preventing the corpora-
tion from performing true-ups Shawe had persistently blocked Elting from 
being able to determine if she was owed extra compensation.57 
A third area of controversy that the court pointed to evincing a com-
plete deadlock was Shawe and Elting’s fundamental discord in setting hir-
ing and retention policies for employment personnel and advisors.58 Elting 
had expressed a desire to terminate a number of senior executives whom 
she believed to have sided with Shawe and were “insubordinate” to her de-
spite her role as co-CEO of the corporation.59 Having discussed the nature 
of the contention surrounding distributions, acquisitions, true-ups, and hir-
ing decisions, the Chancery Court had little trouble concluding that Shawe 
and Elting, the sole directors of the corporation, were in such a state of 
deadlock regarding management decisions that curative action could not be 
obtained.60 Before moving on to discuss whether the second required condi-
                                                                                                                           
 54 See id. 
 55 Id. at *27. Here, the term “true up” is being used as an accounting term referring to a reconcil-
iatory process of squaring projected balance sheet values with real-time reports of the business’s 
assets, inventory, ecetera. See True-up, BUSINESSDICTIONARY, http://www.business
dictionary.com/definition/true-up.html [https://perma.cc/JFP3-Z89G]. 
 56 In re Shaw, 2015 WL 4874733 at *27. The court unequivocally sided with Elting on this 
issue and justified Elting’s distrust of Shawe as entirely reasonable. See id. To support its assertion 
that Elting’s distrust of Shawe was justified, the court pointed to a host of ostensibly hostile en-
deavors that Shawe undertook including taking part in a “secret campaign to spy on Elting,” seek-
ing to have Elting prosecuted by filing a “Domestic Incident Report” after an apparently benign 
altercation, and distributing an inter-office memorandum to employees in Elting’s division “accus-
ing her of collusion and financial improprieties.” See id. 
 57 See id. The court sided with Elting on both of these disagreements, stating that with respect 
to the disagreement over acquisitions, Elting’s distrust of Shawe was unquestionably justified, and 
added that, regarding their disagreements over true-ups, it “historically had been the case” that 
Shawe’s expenses exceeded Elting’s. See id. 
 58 See id. 
 59 See id. Shawe opposed these organizational changes, and the two were also unable to agree 
on how to replace the head of Human Resources or how to hire a new public relations firm, leav-
ing the corporation without either since 2014. Id. 
 60 See id. at *28; Hoban, 1984 WL 8221, at *1 (describing the degree of director deadlock 
required in order to justify a finding that Section 226(a)(2) has been satisfied). Accordingly, hav-
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tion under Section 226(a)(2) (harm to the business) was satisfied, the court 
took a quick detour, reviewing a claim that Elting had manufactured a dead-
lock in order to a achieve a court-ordered sale (i.e., Shawe’s bad faith de-
fense, which will be addressed in Part II of this Note).61 
Recognizing that the second condition (harm to the business) was a 
“closer question than the mere existence of deadlocks,” the court dedicated 
a lengthy discussion to this portion of the analysis.62 The court was faced 
with the unavoidable fact that at the time it issued its decision, the corpora-
tion was (and still is) highly profitable.63 Shawe continued to argue on ap-
peal that the appointment of a custodian under Section 226(a)(2) was inap-
propriate in the context of a profitable corporation.64 Chancellor Bouchard, 
however, rejected the idea that the fact that the Corporation was profitable 
was dispositive, and reasoned that even profitable corporations can be faced 
with a threat of “irreparable injury.”65 Accordingly, although recognizing 
                                                                                                                           
ing found that the first condition under Section 226(a)(2) (director deadlock) was satisfied, the 
court proceeded to analyze whether the second and third conditions were satisfied (irreparable 
harm to the business as a result of the deadlock, and stockholder inability to break the deadlock). 
See In re Shaw, 2015 WL 4874733, at *28–30 (finding Section 226(a)(2) satisfied). 
 61 See In re Shaw, 2015 WL 4874733, at *28 (refusing to accept Shawe’s contention that 
“Elting had manufactured the deadlocks . . . simply to facilitate a sale of the Company and liqui-
date her interest in it”). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at *28 n.292 (citing Post-Trial Brief for Respondent at 71–78, In re Shawe & Elting 
(2015) (C.A. No. 9661-CB, C.A. No. 9686-CB, C.A. No. 9700-CB, C.A. No. 10449-CB)). The 
question of whether or not the business of the corporation was faced with irreparable injury lies at 
the heart of much of the public debate and discourse surrounding the TransPerfect case. See, e.g., 
Jeff Mordock, Delaware Court Orders TransPerfect Sale, DEL. ONLINE (June 21, 2016), http://
www.delawareonline.com/story/money/2016/06/21/delaware-court-orders-transperfect-sale/86183
404/ [https://perma.cc/N38E-6BF3] (noting the public condemnation of the decision to auction off 
a profitable company). That the Chancery Court erred in focusing too much on the personal dis-
putes between Shawe and Elting and ignored the glaring fact that the corporation was (and is) 
highly profitable also appears to be the crux of Shawe’s arguments on appeal. See Jeff Mordock, 
TransPerfect Case Heads to Delaware Supreme Court, DEL. ONLINE (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.
delawareonline.com/story/money/2016/10/03/transperfect-case-heads-delaware-supreme-court/91
459168/ [https://perma.cc/E8TY-3MQ9] (noting that the appellate briefs filed by Shawe argue that 
the Chancery Court focused too much on the “dysfunctional working environment” at the corpora-
tion, and failed to separate “personal disagreements” from “corporate injury”). 
 64 See Opening Brief for Appellant at 1, 4, Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152 (Del. 2017) (No. 
423, 2016) (arguing that “for the first time in Delaware’s modern corporate history” the Chancery 
Court used Section 226 to force shareholders to sell, and reasoning that the forced sale of such a 
profitable company is inappropriate given the Chancery Court’s inability to point to financial 
harm). 
 65 In re Shaw, 2015 WL 4874733, at *30. Chancellor Bouchard also reasoned that “irrepara-
ble injury” to a corporation can involve more than just financial harm, and can include “harm to a 
corporation’s reputation, goodwill, customer relationships, and employee morale.” See id. at *28 
(citing Kirpat, Inc. v. Del. Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm’n, 741 A.2d 356, 358 (Del. 1998)); 
see also Hollinger Int’l Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1090 (Del. Ch. 2004) (stating that “irrepara-
ble injury” exists whenever a subsequent monetary damages award would require guesswork). 
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the corporation’s high profitability, the court focused on the “dysfunctional” 
nature of the management and concluded that the “irreparable harm” re-
quirement of Section 226(a)(2) was satisfied.66 The court then proceeded to 
conclude that the third requirement of Section 226(a)(2)—that the share-
holders were unable to break the deadlock—was easily satisfied.67 
C. With Section 226(a) Satisfied, Appointment of a Custodian with the 
Power to Sell the Corporation Was Next 
Having found both Section 226(a)(1) and Section 226(a)(2) satisfied, 
the Chancery Court concluded that the appointment of a custodian was war-
ranted.68 As has already been alluded to, it was not merely Chancellor Bou-
chard’s decision to appoint a custodian that placed this case in the national 
spotlight, but his decision as to what the appointed custodian would have 
the authority to do.69 Chancellor Bouchard recognized that he had three 
available options: (i) refrain from appointing a custodian and dismiss the 
Section 226 petition completely; (ii) appoint a custodian to act as a third 
director in order to serve as the “tie-breaking” vote; or (iii) appoint a custo-
dian with the power to sell the corporation.70 He chose the third option.71 
In August 2016, Shawe appealed the Chancery Court’s August 2015 
Order, for the appointment of a custodian with the power to sell the corpora-
                                                                                                                           
 66 In re Shaw, 2015 WL 4874733 at *30. In arriving at the conclusion that the corporation was 
indeed threatened with irreparable harm, the Chancery Court focused on the damage that the feud 
between Shawe and Elting was doing to “employee morale and retention.” See id. at *29 (relying 
on employee statements). The Chancery Court also reasoned that because acquisitions made by 
the company had historically accounted for a significant portion of its revenue, a continued dead-
lock resulting in the prevention of further acquisitions could cause harm to the business. Id. at *30. 
 67 Id at *30. Because the stockholders (Shawe, Elting, and Shawe’s mother (who owns only 
1% of the corporation’s stock) had indeed been unable to elect directors, the court did not need to 
dedicate a lengthy analysis to determining whether the “third condition” under Section 226(a)(2) 
was satisfied. Id. 
 68 Id. at *30–31. 
 69 See Lucas, supra note 6 (arguing that Chancellor Bouchard’s decision to appoint a custodi-
an to sell the corporation constitutes “judicial overreach” especially when considering the corpora-
tion’s high profits and thousands of employees). 
 70 See In re Shawe & Elting LLC, C.A. No. 9661-CB, C.A. No. 9686-CB, C.A. No. 9700-CB, 
C.A. No. 10449-CB, 2015 WL 4874733, at *31 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015). Chancellor Bouchard 
rejected the first option by reasoning that it would be unjust to leave Elting to her own devices and 
force her to sell her 50% interest in the corporation and accepted Elting’s argument that doing so 
would afford Shawe a windfall, because Elting would be able to receive more money were the 
corporation to be sold wholly and then subsequently divided. See id. at *30. Chancellor Bouchard 
rejected the second alternative by reasoning that simply appointing a third director to act as a tie-
breaker would “enmesh” an outsider and the court “into matters of internal corporate governance” 
for an unnecessarily long period of time. See id. Finally, Chancellor Bouchard reasoned that the 
only viable option was option three: appointing a custodian with the power to sell the corporation. 
See id. 
 71 Id. at *31. 
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tion, to the Delaware Supreme Court.72 On appeal, Shawe focused less on 
the underlying factual findings of deadlock and dysfunction and primarily 
argued that the Chancery Court had acted beyond its power by ordering a 
custodian to sell a profitable corporation.73 Shawe also argued that in the 
alternative, the Chancery Court ignored “less drastic measures” that could 
have been taken to remedy the deadlock.74 In a 4–1 decision, the Delaware 
Supreme Court resolutely affirmed Chancellor Bouchard’s decision to ap-
point a custodian with the power to sell the corporation and rejected, for a 
number of reasons, Shawe’s argument that Chancellor Bouchard had gone 
beyond the bounds of the statute.75 
                                                                                                                           
 72 See Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152, 154–55 (Del. 2017). Although this Note will not dis-
cuss the details of the auction plan that the Chancery Court eventually approved, the reader should 
note that the plan allowed for bids from both Elting and Shawe, as well as bids from third parties. 
See Katia Savchuk, Delaware Supreme Court Upholds Forced Sale of TransPerfect and Sanctions 
Against Cofounder, FORBES (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/katiasavchuk/2017/02/
13/delaware-supreme-court-upholds-forced-sale-of-transperfect-and-sanctions-against-cofounder/
#669430417b5b [https://perma.cc/5VYA-THMR]. This is one of many alternatives to conducting 
auctions in business divorce cases. See, e.g., Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, Irreconcila-
ble Differences: Judicial Resolution of Business Deadlock, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 146–47 (2014) 
(discussing the notion that placing a realistic value on the assets of a closely-held corporation is a 
difficult task, and suggesting that courts should use the “Shotgun” auction method in business 
dissolution cases where one owner names a “buy-sell” price, and the other owner must then buy or 
sell at said price). Landeo and Spier reason that the “Shotgun” method has the beneficial effect of 
making the owner who names the buy-sell price choose a price that is fair, because, after all, “he 
or she may end up on either side of the transaction.” See Landeo & Spier, supra. 
 73 See Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d at 155; see also Opening Brief for Appellant at 18–19, 
Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152 (Del. 2017) (No. 423, 2016) (arguing that the Chancery Court’s 
order, which “requires Shawe to sell his own property against his will” is a “radical ruling” and 
that Section 226 only authorizes a custodian to oversee the liquidation or distribution of the “cor-
poration’s assets, not the sale of a stockholder’s property”). 
 74 Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d at 155. Shirley Shawe (Shawe’s mother, and 1% stockholder) 
joined in the appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, yet took an entirely different approach; rep-
resented by Alan Derschowitz, Shirley Shawe argued that the custodian’s sale constitutes an “un-
constitutional taking of her one share” of the corporation’s stock. See id. 
 75 See generally Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152 (affirming the Chancery Court’s decision to 
appoint a custodian with the power to sell the corporation). To the extent that the reader is interested 
in the details and statutory analysis underlying the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision to affirm the 
Chancery Court, she should turn her attention to the lengthy Delaware Supreme Court opinion. See 
generally id. (affirming the Chancery Court’s decision to appoint a custodian with the power to sell 
the corporation). This Note, however, will not go into any further detail on the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s opinion upholding the Chancery Court’s Order, as this Note explores the issue of the bad 
faith defense to the appointment of a custodian under Section 226 (a defense that Shawe raised in 
front of the Chancery Court, but that was not explicitly dealt with on appeal). See In re Shaw, 2015 
WL 4874733, at *28. Because the Delaware Supreme Court did not address Shawe’s bad faith de-
fense, the majority of the citations in the rest of this Note will be to the Chancery Court’s August 
2015 Order, which did, albeit briefly, deal with this argument. See id.; see also Savchuk, supra note 
72 (quoting Elting’s reaction to the Supreme Court decision). The reader should also note that in a 
separate opinion issued on the same day, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed sanctions ordered by 
the Chancery Court against Shawe for misconduct during the course of the litigation in the lower 
court. See Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d at 145. Shawe petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Su-
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Along with an appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, Chancellor 
Bouchard’s decision solicited a palpable outcry in the press, on the Dela-
ware political scene, and even in the form of a lawsuit filed on behalf of 
TransPerfect employees.76 Whether or not the Chancery Court overstepped 
its bounds is not the purpose of this Note, however; rather, this Note ex-
plores the subsidiary issue that the Chancery Court gave relatively short 
shrift when explaining the second condition of Section 226(a)(2): the idea 
of a manufactured deadlock (i.e., the bad faith defense).77 
II. THE BAD FAITH DEFENSE TO JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN PRACTICE 
To say that the Chancery Court’s decision to appoint a custodian to sell 
TransPerfect against the objections of a 50% owner has caused commotion 
in the Delaware business community would be an understatement.78 In the 
months that followed Chancellor Bouchard’s decision, and throughout the 
appeal in front of the Delaware Supreme Court, even a casual observer 
would have likely detected the unusual volume of media attention and out-
                                                                                                                           
preme Court on this separate action regarding the imposition of sanctions (which was denied), but 
has not petitioned for certiorari in the Section 226 action. See id. Following the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s decision to affirm the Chancery Court’s order to force the sale of the company, Shawe stated 
that that he planned to appeal that decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. See Philip Shawe Launches 
the $100,000 Law Student Scholarship Competition to Examine TransPerfect Delaware Case at the 
U.S. Supreme Court Level, PR NEWSWIRE (Mar. 02, 2017), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/philip-shawe-launches-the-100000-law-student-scholarship-competition-to-examine-trans
perfect-delaware-case-at-the-us-supreme-court-level-300415171.html [https://perma.cc/K557-ULH7]. 
Shawe, however, has since ostensibly backed away from that claim, and in November 2017, the 
custodian appointed by the Delaware Chancery Court to oversee the sale announced that an agree-
ment had been reached, which would allow Shawe to purchase Elting’s shares. See Baker, supra note 
12. The Delaware Supreme Court also summarily rejected Shirley Shawe’s constitutional takings 
argument as one that was waived for failure to raise it before the Chancery Court. See Shawe v. Elt-
ing, 157 A.3d at 169. 
 76 See supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text. 
 77 See In re Shaw, 2015 WL 4874733, at *28; Mahler, supra note 18 (describing the bad faith 
defense in relation to business dissolution actions in New York). 
 78 See Jeff Mordock, Facts, Not Law, to Be in Dispute at TransPerfect Hearing, DEL. ONLINE 
(Jan. 17, 2017), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/money/2017/01/17/facts-not-law-dispute-
transperfect-hearing/96659466/ [https://perma.cc/X46R-CWGJ] (predicting that Shawe’s attor-
neys would attempt to argue to the Delaware Supreme Court not that the Chancery Court misap-
plied Delaware law, but rather that the “factual record [did] not support a need for a sale” and 
noting that although the Chancery Court’s decision was supported by certain “corporate jurists,” it 
had also been criticized by certain “high-profile” names, including Rudy Giulani); Leslie Pappas, 
Did Del. Court Violate Shareholder Rights in TransPerfect Case? BLOOMBERG LAW: BIG LAW 
BUS., (Jan. 17, 2017), https://bol.bna.com/did-del-court-violate-shareholder-rights-in-transperfect-
case/ [https://perma.cc/5Z3C-D98A] (suggesting that one of the reasons why this particular case 
has gained so much attention is that, in addition to the fact that TransPerfect is highly profitable, 
there are “relatively few instances of 50-50 corporate disputes” in general, quoting an interview 
with Professor Lawrence Hamermesh from Widener University’s Delaware Law School). 
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rage surrounding the case.79 The decision to use Section 226 to force the 
sale of a profitable Delaware corporation is seen by many as a draconian 
step backwards for Delaware corporate law.80 
Pessimistic as the “pro-business” objectors may be, as a practical mat-
ter, the Delaware Supreme Court has spoken, and unless and until the U.S. 
Supreme Court says otherwise, the question of whether courts may use Sec-
tion 226 to force the sale of a profitable company is no longer up for de-
bate.81 As such, a more productive mode of discourse might focus on issues 
that may arise in the developing doctrine surrounding Section 226 itself, 
rather than one that persists in casting the decision in the TransPerfect case 
as the catalyst for the crumbling of Delaware’s business-friendly empire.82 
                                                                                                                           
 79 See Randall Chase, Judge: It’s Time for TransPerfect’s Delaware Court ‘Saga to End,’ WDEL 
(July 12, 2017), http://www.wdel.com/news/judge-it-s-time-for-transperfect-s-delaware-court-saga/
article_d4c67e34-672a-11e7-a067-4304175186a3.html [https://perma.cc/LTM4-7EHF] (noting 
that a New York judge in a related action filed by Shawe referred to the TransPerfect case history 
as a “saga”); Jeff Mordock, Alan Dershowitz, Justice Strine Spar Over TransPerfect, DEL. 
ONLINE, http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/2017/01/18/sparks-fly-heated-transperfect-case/
96719902/ [https://perma.cc/PUM9-7N5H] (noting that Attorney Alan Dershowitz had been ob-
tained to represent Shawe’s mother in oral arguments in front of the Delaware Supreme Court and 
discussing the fact that the Chancery Court’s decision to appoint a custodian to conduct a sale of 
TransPerfect has “generated a lot of controversy”); Katia Savchuk, Inside the Nasty Corporate Di-
vorce Between Ex-Lovers Who Built a Company Worth Nearly $1 Billion, FORBES (May 25, 2016), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/katiasavchuk/2016/05/25/liz-elting-transperfect-engaged-cofounders-
phil-shawe-corporate-divorce/#32e9694a59c6 [https://perma.cc/9MDX-BNMU] (narrating the back-
ground of the feud between Shawe and Elting). 
 80 See Jeff Feeley, Delaware Judge at Center of Power Controversy Fights Lawsuit, BLOOM-
BERG LAW: BIG L. BUS. (Nov. 8, 2016), https://bol.bna.com/delaware-judge-at-center-of-power-
controversy-fights-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/VD6M-FU9D] (discussing the lawsuit filed by 
TransPerfect’s director of corporate strategy, Timothy Holland, against Delaware Chancery Court 
Judge Andre Bouchard, claiming that Chancellor Bouchard “overstepped his authority” by ap-
pointing a custodian to sell a profitable corporation); see also Mordock, supra note 78 (noting that 
high profile individuals, such as the former New York City Mayor, have “blasted” the decision to 
force the sale of TransPerfect as an instance of inappropriate governmental intrusion into private 
business affairs); Pro Business Group Makes Statement in TransPerfect Case, DEL. ONLINE, 
http://www.delawareonlinecom/videos/news/local/2017/01/18/pro-business-group-makes-statement-
transperfect-case/96735366/ (displaying a video showing Chris Coffey, a spokesperson for Citizens 
for a Pro-Business Delaware, standing with numerous TransPerfect employees outside of the Dela-
ware Supreme Court courthouse, stating that the Chancery Court’s decision to force the sale of such a 
successful company has put the jobs of 4,000 employees in ninety-two countries and forty-six states 
at risk). 
 81 See generally Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152 (Del. 2017) (affirming the Delaware Chan-
cery Court’s decision to appoint a custodian with the power to sell the corporation). 
 82 See Tom McParland, TransPerfect-Linked Group Lobbies to Curb Forced Sales of Corpo-
rations, DEL. L. WKLY. (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.law.com/delawarelawweekly/almID/1202
777316002/?slreturn=20180017072834 [https://perma.cc/8DMM-Y7GY] (providing an example 
of a group that has prophesized that the TransPerfect decision is tantamount to a catastrophe that 
will doom Delaware corporate law if not overturned, Citizens for a Pro-Business Delaware has 
“waged a sophisticated public relations campaign” and has proposed legislation to the Delaware 
State Bar Association, which seeks to “curb the Court of Chancery’s power to appoint a corporate 
custodian”). 
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Although it seems unlikely that the TransPerfect decision will unleash a 
sudden outpouring of new Section 226 petitions, it is likely that the Chan-
cery Court will eventually face the same question in a future case and will 
then be required to square new facts with the precedent laid down in the 
TransPerfect case.83 Although the Chancery Court’s in-depth and deliberate 
decision in the case indicates that the court is, on the whole, well-equipped 
to address future Section 226 petitions, there is one aspect of such cases that 
the TransPerfect case (and previous case law) has left unresolved: how to 
assess the bad faith defense to an involuntary sale under Section 226.84 Sec-
tion A of this part explains in greater depth what the bad faith defense to 
judicial intervention is by illuminating how the defense has been applied in 
other jurisdictions outside of Delaware.85 Section B of this part discusses 
the doctrine’s appearance in Delaware case law.86 
                                                                                                                           
 83 See In re Shawe & Elting LLC, C.A. No. 9661-CB, C.A. No. 9686-CB, C.A. No. 9700-CB, 
C.A. No. 10449-CB, 2015 WL 4874733, at *81 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015) (noting that the legal 
analysis solicited in the TransPerfect case is “unusual”); Pappas, supra note 78 (same). 
 84 See generally In re Shawe, 2015 WL 4874733 (carefully analyzing Elting’s petition for the 
appointment of a custodian). As discussed supra, although he did briefly consider (before reject-
ing) Shawe’s contention that the deadlock was not one that arose out of bona fide business disa-
greements but rather was calculatedly manufactured out of Elting’s desire to eventually force a 
sale of TransPerfect, Chancellor Bouchard’s decision gave relatively little attention to Shawe’s 
bad faith defense. See id. at *28. 
 85 See infra notes 87–105 and accompanying text. 
 86 See infra notes 106–123 and accompanying text. A brief caveat of the foregoing sections is 
necessary: the Chancery Court only cited to one case, Millien v. Popescu, that had dealt with the 
bad faith defense in conjunction with Section 226. See In re Shawe, 2015 WL 4874733, at *28. 
This suggests that Delaware courts have rarely expressly considered the bad faith defense with 
respect to a petition seeking the appointment of a custodian under Section 226. See id.; Millien v. 
Popescu, C.A. No. 8670–VCN, 2014 WL 656651, at *2 n.17 (Del. Ch. Feb. 19, 2014). The Chan-
cery Court did consider what could be called a different version of the defense in a 1983 case, 
Moore v. C.H.M. Enters., Inc., where it denied a Section 226 petition because the petitioner was at 
fault for failing to service the company’s debts, which was the reason for seeking the appointment 
of a custodian through Section 226. See Civ. A. No. 7294, 1983 WL 102620, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 
9, 1983). Similarly, the court more recently suggested that a stockholder should not be allowed to 
use Section 226 to achieve an end that she would not be able to achieve through “proper” conduct. 
See Balch Hill Partners, L.P. v. Shocking Techs., Inc., C.A. No. 8249–VCN, 2013 WL 588964, at 
*3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 7, 2013). Although both Moore and Balch Hill do indeed provide instances 
where the court has inquired into the conduct/intent of the petitioner in a Section 226 action, they 
both concern the broader question of whether “unclean hands” should bar a petitioner from seek-
ing Section 226 relief, and do not deal with the specific issue of a petitioner who actively sought 
to manufacture dissension and deadlock between stockholders or directors for the purpose of con-
vincing the court to appoint a custodian with the power to sell. See Balch Hill, 2013 WL 588964, 
at *3; Moore, 1983 WL 102620, at *2. 
742 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:725 
A. Opposing Views Regarding the Relevance of Allegations  
of a Petitioner’s Bad Faith Motives 
“Irreconcilable differences” leading to deadlocks between business 
owners has been described as a phenomenon somewhat unique to closely-
held business entities, including close corporations, limited partnerships, 
and limited liability companies.87 Dissolution proceedings in Delaware for 
these kinds of entities are governed by Title 8, Section 273 and Title 6, Sec-
tion 18-802 of the Delaware General Corporation Law.88 The TransPerfect 
case sheds light on another provision of Delaware law that deals with dead-
locks in larger corporations with more than two stockholders: Section 226.89 
Although the statutory hurdles over which a Section 226 petitioner must 
overcome might serve as a substantial check against frivolous or meritless 
petitions for judicial intervention, some courts have recognized that the 
statutory option for a court-ordered sale may nonetheless appear an enticing 
exit strategy for 50% shareholders looking to “cash out” of the business.90 
                                                                                                                           
 87 6 AM. JUR. PROOF FACTS 2d 387, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2017) (noting that the 
phenomenon of director deadlock is one that is “peculiar” and particularly crippling to close cor-
porations in part because of the fact that many persons who choose to incorporate their small busi-
nesses using the corporate form do so for tax or limited-liability reasons, and are persons who 
think of themselves as being partners with their co-founder, but do not necessarily consider certain 
implications of the corporate form). 
 88 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 273 (2011) (governing dissolution petitions for joint ventures with 
only two stockholders); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-802 (2013) (governing dissolution proceed-
ings for limited liability companies). 
 89 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226. Although each of these statutes applies to a different 
type of entity, all embrace the goal of resolving deadlocks when the court is convinced not only 
that the company faces irreparable harm but also that there is no possibility of the deadlock being 
resolved. See 16A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA L. CORPS. § 8066.10, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 
2016) (suggesting that the dissolution of a deadlocked corporation is seen by the courts as a last 
resort and detailing alternatives to a forced sale, such as ordering the “buyout of the petitioning 
shareholder” or appointing a director to serve as a tiebreaker). As discussed in Part I supra, Sec-
tion 226 contains somewhat exacting requirements that must be met in order for a court to de-
cide in favor of a petitioner’s request for judicial dissolution. See supra notes 30–77 and ac-
companying text; see also Kenneth A. Gerasimovich, Delaware Chancery Court Appoints a 
Custodian to Sell Deadlocked Company, GREENBERG TRAURIG: INSIGHTS (Dec. 15, 2015), 
https://www.gtlaw.com/en/insights/2015/12/delaware-chancery-court-appoints-a-custodian-to-
sell-deadlocked-company [https://perma.cc/KE5J-H6UV] (noting that the TransPerfect case osten-
sibly posed an “ideal situation” for a Section 273 petition, but that because Shawe’s mother “held 
a nominal 1 percent” of the Corporation, that statute did not apply). 
 90 See e.g., Millien v. Popescu, C.A. No. 8670–VCN, 2014 WL 656651, at *2 n.17 (Del. Ch. 
Feb. 19, 2014) (refusing to grant dissolution under Section 226(a)(2) in part because the petition-
ing stockholder “sought to create a deadlock by refusing to consider any issue” and concluding 
that the statute was not meant to apply to such circumstances); Feinberg v. Silverberg, Decision 
and Order, Index No. 3120-11, at *8 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cty. Sept. 6, 2013) (discussing the phenom-
enon of the manufactured deadlock created in bad faith by a 50% shareholder in order to obtain a 
court-ordered dissolution and examining cases that have both accepted and rejected such alleged 
manufacturing as a defense to dissolution under New York’s dissolution statute (N.Y. BUS. CORP. 
LAW § 1104), which largely mirrors Section 226). 
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Said another way, courts have noted the possibility that a savvy individual 
with a goal of selling a business over the objections of his or her co-owner 
could act in bad faith with the specific purpose of manufacturing a deadlock 
as a long-term litigation strategy in the hopes of achieving a court-ordered 
sale.91 
At first glance, it might seem only fair that the objecting 50% sharehold-
er be able to respond to a petition for judicial intervention by alleging that the 
deadlock has not arisen out of a bona fide business disagreement but rather 
out of a premeditated attempt on the part of the petitioner to create the ap-
pearance of an irreconcilable situation (i.e., employ the bad faith defense).92 
That being said, courts have recognized that it is not entirely clear whether 
such a defense should be accepted.93 Namely, there is a question as to wheth-
er a finding of fault on the part of the petitioner is even relevant to dissolution 
statutes, which ostensibly ask only whether there is an irreconcilable dead-
lock, but do not concern themselves with why.94 In Feinberg v. Silverberg, a 
2013 case in New York, the court was faced with this very question and dis-
cussed the conundrum that the bad faith defense posed with respect to invol-
untary dissolution cases brought under Section 1104 of New York’s Business 
Corporation Law (a statute that for the purposes of this Note can be consid-
ered analogous to Section 226).95 
Citing a number of New York appellate cases, the Feinberg court asked 
whether or not the alleged bad faith of a petitioner seeking dissolution is 
even relevant.96 As explained in Feinberg, some courts have reasoned that 
                                                                                                                           
 91 See Feinberg, Index No. 3120-11, at *8. 
 92 See Post-Trial Brief for Respondent at 4–5, 7, In re Shawe & Elting (2015) (C.A. No. 
9661-CB, C.A. No. 9686-CB, C.A. No. 9700-CB, C.A. No. 10449-CB). In the TransPerfect case, 
Shawe argued at length that long before filing the petition for dissolution under Section 226, Elt-
ing set into motion a “calculated plan” to achieve a court-ordered sale of the corporation by “re-
fusing to exercise her business judgment and by manufacturing ‘deadlock’ for purposes of litiga-
tion.” See id. at 4–5. 
 93 See, e.g., Feinberg, Index No. 3120-11, at *3–6 (illuminating opposing views regarding 
whether or not bad faith should be considered in dissolution proceedings). 
 94 See id. (ultimately finding that a petitioner’s bad faith is relevant in deciding whether to 
order the dissolution of a business, but acknowledging that some courts have ostensibly supported 
the opposing argument that the petitioner’s motives are irrelevant); Mahler, supra note 18. 
 95 See Feinberg, Index No. 3120-11, at *3–6. In Feinberg, the objecting shareholder alleged 
that the petitioner had intentionally created the “very basis for dissension”. See id. The objecting 
shareholder argued that the petitioner did this with the ultimate goal of convincing a court that the 
two shareholders were in such a state of deadlock that the business must be sold. See id. For a 
more detailed discussion of the Feinberg decision, see Peter Mahler’s September 16, 2013, article, 
Is Bad Faith a Defense in Deadlock Dissolution Proceedings? which provides an excellent analy-
sis of the Feinberg decision and succinctly summarizes the opposing views in New York case law 
regarding the viability of the bad faith defense. See Mahler, supra note 18. 
 96 Feinberg, Index No. 3120-11, at *2, *4–6, *8 (citing In re Goodman v. Lovett, 200 A.D.2d 
670, 670–71 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (holding that the reasons underlying the dissension are irrele-
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the corporate dissolution statute does not solicit an investigation into the 
underlying reason for dissension and that it is entirely irrelevant to “ascribe 
fault” to either the petitioner or the respondent.97 This line of analysis posits 
that the court’s only concern should be whether or not dissension exists and 
whether it has led to a deadlock between co-owners.98 This position appears 
to suggest that even if a petitioner maliciously instigated quarrels with a co-
owner with the specific intent of creating dissension, a resulting deadlock, 
though manufactured, is still a deadlock.99 
As noted in Feinberg, courts endorsing the opposing approach have 
explicitly explored the reasons underlying the dissension, inquired into the 
fault on the part of the petitioner, and held that an allegation of bad faith on 
the part of a petitioner constitutes a valid defense to dissolution proceed-
ings.100 The Feinberg court recognized that although these two competing 
strands of cases may appear “contradictory,” they can actually be “harmo-
nized.”101 According to Feinberg, an inquiry into fault on the part of a peti-
tioner is sometimes relevant.102 The court explained that in cases where 
courts have rejected the relevance of the reasons behind the dissension, the 
“common thread” was that there was “no real dispute” as to whether the 
deadlock at issue was “bona fide”, thus making an examination of fault un-
necessary.103 Alternatively, according to Feinberg, in cases where the court 
                                                                                                                           
vant) and In re Meyers v. Gold, 77 A.D.2d 652, 652 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (embracing the posi-
tion that “allegations of a petitioner’s bad faith constitute a defense to a dissolution proceeding”)). 
 97 See In re Goodman, 200 A.D.2d at 670–71 (noting that it is unnecessary to examine the 
reasons underlying a deadlock because the law governing court-ordered dissolution only asks if 
dissension exists and does not solicit an inquiry into the “underlying reasons for the dissension”). 
 98 See id. A strict interpretation of a judicial dissolution statute such as Title 8, Section 226 of 
the Delaware General Corporation Law or Section 1104 of the New York Business Corporation 
Law appears to support the argument that the underlying reason for the dissension between co-
owners is entirely irrelevant to whether a court should grant dissolution based on sharehold-
er/director deadlock. See id. A proponent of this view might argue that because the goal support-
ing such statutes is to act as a remedy of last resort by salvaging for the company’s shareholders 
whatever value is obtainable, the pivotal inquiry is whether a deadlock posing irreparable harm 
exists, and not why that deadlock exists. See id. This argument is endorsed in Part III of this Note. 
See infra notes 124–174 and accompanying text. 
 99 See In re Gordon & Weiss, 32 A.D.2d 279, 279 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969) (rejecting the notion 
that the alleged bad faith of a petitioner seeking dissolution under New York’s Business Corpora-
tion Law Section 1104 is relevant); see also Mahler, supra note 18. 
 100 See Feinberg, Index No. 3120-11, at *6–7, *8 (citing In re Meyers, 77 A.D.2d at 652); see 
also Mahler, supra note 18. Mahler describes the treatment of New York’s judicial dissolution 
statute (N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1104) as a “spectrum,” with cases that consider the statute to be a 
“no-fault statute” and focus solely on whether or not the owners “can no longer get along” on one 
side; and cases that inquire into the “reasons for, and the bona fides of the alleged dissension” in 
deciding whether or not to order a dissolution on the other. See Mahler, supra note 18. 
 101 See Feinberg, Index No. 3120-11, at *8; see also Mahler, supra note 18. 
 102 See Feinberg, Index No. 3120-11, at *8. 
 103 Id.; see, e.g., In re Goodman, 200 A.D.2d at 670–71 (rejecting consideration of petitioner’s 
bad faith by reasoning that “the underlying reason for the dissension is of no moment”); In re 
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has agreed to inquire into the cause of the apparent discord between co-
owners, there was a legitimate question as to whether the deadlock was “re-
al” or “feigned”.104 As such, Feinberg concluded that a finding of fault is 
immaterial when dissension and deadlock “actually exist” but that the “in-
tent” for creating dissension and deadlock is significant in distinguishing 
between that which is “real” from that which is “feigned.”105 
B. Delaware’s Treatment of the Bad Faith Defense in  
Section 273 and Section 18-802 Cases 
Although discussion of the bad faith defense in Delaware cases involv-
ing petitions for judicial intervention under Section 226 is sparse, a number 
of Delaware cases have explicitly discussed its applicability to Delaware’s 
dissolution statute for limited liability companies (“LLCs”) (Title 6, Section 
18-802) and for joint ventures with only two stockholders (Title 8, Section 
273).106 Although an analysis of such cases does, in the aggregate, lead to 
the conclusion that Delaware has historically been willing to recognize the 
bad faith defense, it has not yet offered a concrete approach for assessing 
the defense.107 Indeed, the Delaware Chancery Court has provided minimal 
                                                                                                                           
Gordon, 32 A.D.2d at 279 (stating that the alleged bad faith of a petitioner seeking dissolution 
under N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1104 is irrelevant); see also Mahler, supra note 18. 
 104 See Feinberg, Index No. 3120-11, at *8; see also Mahler, supra note 18. Other jurisdic-
tions have also supported the acceptability of the bad faith defense in deadlock dissolution cases. 
See McLaren v. Falk, No. 88-38-II, 1988 WL 53353, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 1988). For 
example, in McLaren, the Tennessee Court of Appeals analogized the need for such a defense by 
stating: “A party should not be allowed to create dissension in the corporation, and then, like the 
defendant who killed his parents and begged for mercy because he was an orphan, use this 
grounds for the courts to dissolve the corporation.” See id. 
 105 Feinberg, Index No. 3120-11, at *8. The court referred to “manufactured creation” of 
dissension as “the sine qua non” of bad faith and reasoned that a finding of such manufacturing 
would “belie a finding that the shareholders’ dissension poses an irreconcilable barrier to the con-
tinued functioning and prosperity of the corporation.” See id. Peter Mahler notes that the 2013 
Feinberg decision was important in that it appeared to resolve (to a degree) the confusion over the 
applicability of the bad faith defense in “deadlock dissolution” cases for businesses with two 50% 
owners, but that since 1984, the bad faith defense has been used in dissolution cases brought by 
minority shareholders. See Mahler, supra note 18. 
 106 See, e.g., Vila v. BVWebTies LLC, C.A. No. 4308-VCS, 2010 WL 3866098, at *7 (Del. 
Ch. Oct., 1, 2010) (describing the bad faith defense to judicial dissolution in the context of an LLC 
and holding that the fact that the owner had attempted to “implement changes” and offer solutions 
to resolve dissension prior to asserting that an impasse existed suggested that his actions were not 
in bad faith); Arthur Treacher’s Fish & Chips, Inc. v. Ft. Lauderdale, Inc., 386 A.2d 1162, 1167 
(Del. Ch. May 10, 1978) (refusing to strike a bad faith defense to a dissolution petition pursuant to 
Title 8, Section 273 of the Delaware General Corporation Law); In re Bermor, Inc., No. VC 8401-
VCL, 2015 WL 554861, at *3–4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 9, 2016) (reasoning that actions taken by a peti-
tioner in an LLC dissolution case were not bad faith attempts to create dissension, but could be 
explained by other reasons). 
 107 See Wilford v. Coltea, No. 15-856-BC, at *11 (Tenn. Ch. 20th Dist. May 16, 2016) (apply-
ing Delaware law to a petition for dissolution brought under Tennessee’s dissolution statute and 
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instruction for how to investigate the reasons underlying apparent dissen-
sion, i.e., how to determine whether a deadlock between owners is genuine 
or phony.108 For example, in Arthur Treacher’s Fish & Chips, Inc. v. Fort 
Lauderdale, Inc., the court welcomed the respondent’s defense to a dissolu-
tion petition that alleged that the petitioner sought dissolution “in further-
ance of a scheme and conspiracy” to “coerce” petitioner into selling his 
stake in the company.109 Although the court accepted the respondent’s con-
tention that the court should scrutinize the motives underlying the petition, 
the court neither discussed a method for how to identify bad faith motives, 
nor explained how a deadlock caused by bad faith motives differs in practi-
cal effect from a deadlock that is bona fide. 110 
The methodology employed in a more recent case discussing the bad 
faith defense, In re McKinney-Ringham, is similarly unclear.111 There, the 
court provided the opaque explanation that its only grounds for refusing to 
grant dissolution would be if the petitioner knew that there was “no bona 
fide disagreement between the parties justifying a basis for disagreement 
over the dissolution of [the company].”112 The McKinney-Ringham court 
expressed a concern that there may be times when a petition for dissolution 
                                                                                                                           
noting the infrequency with which Delaware courts have discussed the bad faith defense). Com-
pare In re McKinney-Ringham Corp., No. Civ. A. 15071, 1998 WL 118035, at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 
27, 1998) (implicitly endorsing the viability of the bad faith defense by reasoning that dissension 
between owners must be “bona fide”), with Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. Civ. A. 3017-CC, 
2009 WL 73957, at * 6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 2009), aff’d, 984 A.2d 14 (Del. 2009) (offering reason-
ing that could be read to weaken the viability of the bad faith defense). Peter Mahler’s September 
19, 2016, article Bad Faith Defense Gets Boost in LLC Dissolution Case discusses the Wilford 
case and notes that Wilford might suggest that the bad faith defense is gaining legitimacy in cases 
involving the dissolution of Delaware LLCs. See Mahler, supra note 22. See generally Wilford, 
Case No. 15-856–BC (assessing the bad faith defense to dissolution of an LLC governed by Del-
aware law). 
 108 See e.g., Millien v. Popescu, C.A. No. 8670–VCN, 2014 WL 656651, at *2 n.17 (Del. Ch. 
Feb. 19, 2014) (implying that allegations that a petitioner had manufactured a deadlock in a Sec-
tion 226 action would constitute a legitimate defense without explaining how to differentiate a 
deadlock that a party “sought to create” from a bona fide deadlock); In re McKinney-Ringham, 
1998 WL 118035, at *5 (stating that a court could deny the appointment of a custodian if there 
was no “bona fide disagreement between the parties” but omitting a discussion of how to deter-
mine whether a disagreement is “bona fide”); Arthur Treacher’s, 386 A.2d at 1166 (inferring that 
bad faith could constitute a legitimate defense, but omitting an explanation of a method for exam-
ining the motives underlying a dissolution petition). 
 109 See 386 A.2d at 1166. The court in Arthur Treacher’s agreed that it is appropriate to “scru-
tinize” the “motive and purpose” of a Section 273 petition and underscored that it was “duty-
bound” to stand up for the interests of shareholders, but did not explain protocol for determining 
the difference between a deadlock arising out of improper motives versus a deadlock arising out of 
genuine disagreements. See id. 
 110 See id. at 1167. 
 111 In re McKinney-Ringham, 1998 WL 118035, at *5. 
 112 See id. (noting that the court’s role is to determine whether the dispute between owners is 
actually bona fide but omitting an explanation detailing what a non-bona fide or false disagree-
ment would look like). 
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is based on reasons other than a “genuine impasse” but declined to explain 
how to differentiate between disputes that are genuine and those that are 
manufactured.113 
To complicate matters, the Delaware Chancery Court has set forth rea-
soning that could be read to contradict its ostensible position that an allega-
tion of bad faith motives for seeking dissolution is an acceptable defense at 
all.114 For example, in Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, the Chancery Court ex-
plained that a co-owner of the business at issue had the right “to attempt to 
maximize its position” and the mere fact that he stood to benefit by petition-
ing for dissolution was not grounds for rejecting the petition.115 Also stand-
ing in the face of the argument that the court should examine a petitioner’s 
underlying motives is dicta set forth in McKinney-Ringham, where the court 
stated that it was a given that any petitioner seeking dissolution does so 
having come to the conclusion that the benefits of selling the company out-
weigh the benefits of continuing to carry on business.116 Finally, the Dela-
ware Chancery Court has also suggested that allegations calling into ques-
tion the integrity of a petitioner are better suited for breach of fiduciary duty 
actions, not dissolution proceedings.117 
                                                                                                                           
 113 See id. The McKinney-Ringham court ultimately ordered dissolution, stating that it was 
satisfied that there was a bona fide disagreement about whether or not to continue the business, 
and also noted that the “potential for an inequitable result” for the opposing shareholders is not a 
sufficient reason for declining to order dissolution. See id. at *6–7. 
 114 See, e.g., Fisk Ventures, 2009 WL 73957, at * 6 (noting that the fact that petitioner stands 
to secure an advantageous position by seeking a court-ordered dissolution does not mean that the 
petition has been sought in bad faith and should be rejected). 
 115 See id. The court in Fisk Ventures rejected respondent’s argument that petitioner sought 
dissolution in bad faith and stated that respondent had failed to show that petitioner’s sole motiva-
tion for seeking dissolution was “to buy [the company’s] assets at fire sale price” calling such an 
argument a “conclusory allegation of inequitable action as a last-ditch effort” to deny a motion to 
dismiss. See id. 
 116 See In re McKinney-Ringham, 1998 WL 118035, at *5. The obviousness that anyone seek-
ing a petition for dissolution (or, in the case of the TransPerfect case, seeking the appointment of a 
custodian to sell the corporation) has already concluded that doing so would be more advanta-
geous or financially beneficial for the petitioner than carrying on in the course of business appears 
to be a somewhat legitimate argument for rejecting the bad faith defense. See id. The bad faith 
defense is premised on the fact that a petitioner who seeks dissolution (or the appointment of a 
custodian) by manufacturing a deadlock is committing an injustice. See Feinberg, Index No. 
3120–11, at *8. The fact that the petitioner has decided that dissolution or a forced sale would be 
financially beneficial and undertakes a long-term strategy to effectuate that goal appears on the 
one hand, inequitable and malicious. See id. On the other hand, whether intentional or not, the 
court’s dicta in McKinney-Ringham suggests that such an inquiry into the petitioner’s motives is 
equivalent to staring deeply into a shallow pool: obviously a petitioner has calculated that seeking 
a dissolution or forced sale would be in their favor—otherwise, they would not be filing the peti-
tion in the first place. See McKinney-Ringham, 1998 WL 118035, at *5. 
 117 See Wilford, Case No. 15-856–BC, at *13 (citing In re Cambridge Fin. Grp., Ltd., No. Civ. 
A. 9279, 1987 WL 19677, at *3 (Del. Ch. Nov. 9, 1987) (noting that there is a “thread running 
through Delaware law” claims akin to “breach of fiduciary duty claims” that should not be as-
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Although the Chancery Court has occasionally appeared to deliver 
contradictory and ambiguous reasoning with respect to the acceptability of 
the bad faith defense, it has not left entirely unanswered the question of how 
to determine whether a deadlock is bona fide or manufactured.118 In 2010, 
in Vila v. BVWebTies LLC, the Chancery Court offered slightly more helpful 
insight into the manner in which a court can reasonably assess a bad faith 
defense.119 There, the court appeared to take into consideration factors such 
as “circumstantial evidence of intent, . . . design and timing, [and the peti-
tioner’s] credibility” to draw inferences as to whether or not a petitioner had 
manufactured a deadlock in a bad faith attempt to force a sale.120 For exam-
ple, by tracing the timeline leading up to a professed deadlock between the 
business’s owners, the court found that the petitioner had taken a series of 
steps that appeared to be “last ditch” efforts to prevent an impending dead-
lock before ultimately filing an action for dissolution.121 Such attempts at 
remedial action, the court noted, indicated that the petitioner’s ultimate de-
cision to file a petition for dissolution was not the product of a long-term exit 
strategy and demonstrated that the deadlock was genuine.122 Suffice it to say 
that although the mode of analysis set forth in Vila could be seen as a step in 
the right direction, it is far from a concrete formulation for determining 
whether a deadlock is phony or genuine.123 
III. DELAWARE COURTS SHOULD REJECT THE AVAILABILITY OF THE BAD 
FAITH DEFENSE IN SECTION 226 PROCEEDINGS 
Although there is at least a traceable body of case law surrounding the 
Chancery Court’s treatment of the bad faith defense in Section 273 and Sec-
tion 18-802 cases, the court has rarely given explicit consideration to the 
                                                                                                                           
sessed in petitions seeking court-ordered dissolutions); In re S. One-Stop, Inc., No. Civ. A. 7500, 
1986 WL 628588, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 3, 1986)). 
 118 See Vila, 2010 WL 3866098, at *7 (inquiring as to whether or not an alleged deadlock was 
genuine). 
 119 See id. (ultimately finding that the plaintiff had not “manufactured a phony deadlock”). 
 120 See Wilford, Case No. 15-856-BC, at *6 (citing Vila, 2010 WL 3866098, at *8). In Wil-
ford, the Tennessee Business Court was faced with deciding whether to accept a bad faith defense 
to judicial dissolution of a Delaware LLC and set forth a detailed analysis of how Delaware cases 
have dealt with the bad faith defense in relation to the Delaware General Corporation Law Title 8, 
Section 273 and Title 6, 18-802; see also Mahler, supra note 22 (discussing the Wilford case). 
 121 Vila, 2010 WL 3866098, at *4, *7. The Vila court underscored the fact that the petitioner 
had, in what the court considered to be an attempt to prevent a deadlock, “proposed to personally 
commit an additional $500,000 of capital and sought to implement managerial changes he hoped 
would transform [the LLC]” before claiming that the company was deadlocked. See id at *7. Such 
gestures, the court said, indicated that the petitioner had not “in bad faith manufactured a phony 
deadlock” in an attempt to achieve a financial gain by securing a court order to dissolve the busi-
ness. Id. 
 122 See Vila, 2010 WL 3866098, at *7. 
 123 See id. 
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merits of the defense in a petition for the appointment of a custodian under 
Section 226.124 Considering the rarity with which courts have used Section 
226 to appoint a custodian to sell a company over the objections of a co-
owner, the dearth of precedent analyzing the bad faith defense in Section 
226 cases is unsurprising.125 Although the Chancery Court in the TransPer-
fect case rejected Shawe’s argument that Elting had manufactured the dead-
lock in bad faith, the court implicitly acknowledged that as a general matter, 
an allegation that an owner/director acted in bad faith to manufacture a 
deadlock constitutes a valid defense to a Section 266 action.126 Although the 
Chancery Court did not seize on the opportunity to clarify a clear standard 
for determining whether a deadlock is manufactured or genuine, courts may 
be required to do so in the wake of the TransPerfect case.127 One way for 
                                                                                                                           
 124 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 226, 273 (2011) (authorizing court-ordered dissolution upon 
petition by a co-owner of a deadlocked joint venture with only two stockholders); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 6, § 18-802 (2013) (authorizing court-ordered dissolution upon petition by an owner of a 
Delaware limited liability company). Although there are a number of Delaware cases that discuss 
the bad faith defense in conjunction with Section 273 and Section 18-802 cases, the only “prece-
dent” cited in the TransPerfect decision suggesting that the Chancery Court had previously con-
sidered the applicability of allegations of bad faith manufacturing to a Section 226 petition is 
found in a footnote in a 2014 case that was primarily a contractual dispute between business own-
ers. See Millien v. Popescu, C.A. No. 8670–VCN, 2014 WL 656651, at *2 n.17 (Del. Ch. Feb. 19, 
2014). There, the court noted that although one party’s petition for the appointment of a custodian 
under Section 226 was moot because of the court’s decision on the contract dispute, the petition 
would nonetheless have been denied because the petitioner had “sought to create a deadlock by 
refusing to consider any issue.” See id.; see also Mahler, supra note 22 (discussing the bad faith 
defense in relation to a Delaware LLC dissolution proceeding). 
 125 See In re Shawe & Elting, LLC, C.A. No. 9661-CB, C.A. No. 9686-CB, C.A. No. 9700-
CB, C.A. No. 10449-CB, 2015 WL 4874733, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015), aff’d, Shawe v. 
Elting, 157 A.3d 152 (Del. 2017). The disagreement over whether the claim that the TransPerfect 
case is the first time that Section 226 has been used to force a sale over the objections of a 50% 
owner is indeed accurate. See id. Although the Chancery Court took the position that such use is 
rare but not unprecedented, and Shawe’s lawyers repeatedly pointed out that in previous cases 
where Section 226 had been used to force a sale over the other owner’s objections, the owners 
were nonetheless in agreement that the business needed to be terminated yet simply could not 
agree as to the proper method of sale. See Opening Brief for Appellant, at 20–21, Shawe v. Elting, 
157 A.3d 152 (Del. 2017) (No. 423, 2016). In his opening appellate brief, Shawe argued that nei-
ther of the two cases that the Chancery Court relied on in arguing that appointing a custodian with 
the power to sell is not unprecedented answers “the critical question of whether a forced sale is 
permitted because in each the stockholders had agreed that the company should be liquidated or 
sold.” See id. 
 126 See In re Shawe, 2015 WL 4874733, at *28 (quoting Millien, 2014 WL 656651, at *2 
n.17) (noting that “this is not a case where a director has ‘sought to create a deadlock by refusing 
to consider any issue’”). The Chancery Court did not reject Shawe’s defense that Elting had manu-
factured the deadlock because such an argument does not constitute a valid defense, but because, 
according to the Chancery Court, the facts indicated that the deadlock was due to “genuine, good 
faith divisions.” See id. 
 127 See generally In re Shawe, 2015 WL 4874733 (omitting an in-depth discussion of how to 
determine if a deadlock is manufactured). Because the Chancery Court in the TransPerfect case 
tacitly acknowledged that allegations of bad faith deadlock manufacturing could constitute a valid 
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courts to address allegations of deadlocks manufactured in bad faith in rela-
tion to Section 226 actions would be to carry over the (vague) guidelines for 
determining whether a deadlock is genuine or manufactured from Section 
273 and Section 18-802 cases.128 
A preferable, albeit more radical, approach to dealing with the bad 
faith defense in Section 226 cases might be to reject the legitimacy of the 
defense entirely.129 The remainder of this Note offers support for this alter-
native approach.130 By drawing on the opaqueness of courts’ assessments of 
allegations of manufactured deadlocks in Section 273 and Section 18-802 
cases, and on the difficulties faced by the Chancery Court in weighing the 
same allegations in the TransPerfect case, Section A of this part argues that 
abandoning the bad faith defense entirely in Section 226 actions makes 
sense from a practical standpoint.131 Section B of this part opines that the 
bad faith defense also breaks down from a theoretical viewpoint, and con-
cludes by reviewing divorce proceedings, an analogous area of law that 
could be used to support the prohibition of the bad faith defense.132 
A. As a Practical Matter, Rejecting the Applicability of the Bad Faith 
Defense in Section 226 Actions Will Leave the Courts Better Off 
In rejecting Shawe’s contention that Elting had manufactured the dead-
lock leading to her filing of the Section 226 petition in bad faith, the 
TransPerfect court implicitly acknowledged that such claims, if substantiat-
ed by the facts, could constitute a valid defense in future cases.133 Given 
that the Chancery Court has not explicitly answered whether inquiring into 
allegations of a manufactured deadlock is relevant to a Section 226 action, 
                                                                                                                           
defense, it is likely that respondents in Section 226 actions will continue to attempt to employ the 
bad faith defense, which might eventually signal to the courts that the development of a workable 
standard for distinguishing manufactured deadlocks from genuine deadlocks is necessary. See id. 
at *28. 
 128 See supra notes 106–123 and accompanying text (noting the lack of tangible explanations 
in Delaware LLC dissolution cases for how to determine whether a deadlock is phony or genuine). 
 129 See supra notes 106–123 and accompanying text; see also In re Goodman v. Lovett, 200 
A.D.2d 670, 670–71 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (stating that the “underlying reason” for deadlock is 
“of no matter” and that it is also unnecessary to “ascribe fault to either party”). Again, the reader 
should note that In re Goodman and other cases cited by Feinberg v. Silverberg assessed the bad 
faith defense in the context of New York law, but that the reasoning therein is arguably applicable 
to Delaware law. See Feinberg v. Silverberg, Decision and Order, Index No. 3120-11, at *8 (Sup. 
Ct. Nassau Cty. Sept. 6, 2013); In re Goodman, 200 A.D.2d at 670–71. 
 130 See infra notes 131–174 and accompanying text. 
 131 See infra notes 133–147 and accompanying text. 
 132 See infra notes 148–174 and accompanying text. 
 133 See In re Shawe & Elting, LLC, C.A. No. 9661-CB, C.A. No. 9686-CB, C.A. No. 9700-
CB, C.A. No. 10449-CB, 2015 WL 4874733, at *28 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2015) (acknowledging 
(implicitly) the viability of the bad faith defense as a general matter by asserting that the facts of 
the case did not demonstrate that the deadlock had been manufactured). 
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courts faced with assessing the bad faith defense in future Section 226 ac-
tions will have the opportunity to diverge from the Chancery Court’s hesi-
tant acceptance of the bad faith defense in Section 273 and Section 18-802 
cases.134 In this sense, the door for rectifying the maladies of the bad faith 
defense is wide open in Section 226 actions, and from a practical stand-
point, the most rational option might be to reject the relevance of allega-
tions of a petitioner’s bad faith in these proceedings entirely.135 An inquiry 
into the motives underlying a Section 226 petition requires extensive fact-
finding, and will inexorably hinge on inferences drawn from circumstantial 
evidence of the petitioner’s subjective goals.136 
The difficulty in assessing the bad faith defense is illuminated by the 
TransPerfect court’s rejection of Shawe’s bad faith defense despite its ad-
                                                                                                                           
 134 See id. Cases in both Delaware and foreign jurisdictions have delivered ostensibly contra-
dictory arguments relevant to the question of whether to incorporate the bad faith defense into 
corporate-dissolution jurisprudence. See supra notes 87–123 and accompanying text. In his article 
detailing the Feinberg decision’s treatment of the bad faith defense in New York, Peter Mahler 
describes a “spectrum”: on one side rests the position that an inquiry into the reasons underlying 
apparent deadlock or dissension is both unnecessary and irrelevant. See Feinberg, Index No. 
3120–11, at *8; In re Goodman, 200 A.D.2d at 670–71; Mahler, supra note 18. This position 
embraces the argument that the only relevant question for the court is whether a deadlock exists, 
and thus a finding of fault on the part of the petitioner is wholly inconsequential. See Feinberg, 
Index No. 3120–11, at *8; In re Goodman, 200 A.D.2d at 670–71; Mahler, supra note 18. On the 
opposite side of the “spectrum” rest cases that have taken the opposite approach: that although the 
existence of a deadlock is a threshold requirement, the court would be remiss not to investigate 
into the causes motivating the apparent dissension, in order to unearth the possibility that the dead-
lock has been manufactured in bad faith. See Mahler, supra note 18; see, e.g., In re Meyers, 77 
A.D.2d 652, 652 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980). One might envision the middle ground as being occupied 
by a number of Delaware Chancery Court cases that accept the legitimacy of the bad faith defense 
in dissolution proceedings under Title 8, Section 273 and Title 6, Section 18-802 of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law, but evince slightly differing, even inconsistent, views on its application. 
See, e.g., Wilford v. Coltea, No. 15-856-BC, at *12–13 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. 20th Dist. May 16, 2016) 
(citing In re McKinney-Ringham Corp., No. Civ. A. 15071, 1998 WL 118035, at * 5 (Del. Ch. Ct. 
Feb. 27, 1998)) (noting that the court could deny a dissolution petition if it found that a deadlock 
had been manufactured, but also stating that the fact that a party might bring a dissolution action 
only after concluding that doing so could lead to a beneficial result does not indicate that the dis-
solution was manufactured)); Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, No. Civ. A. 3017-CC, 2009 WL 
73957, at *6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, 2009), aff’d, 984 A.2d 14 (Del. 2009) (noting that the fact that 
petitioner stands to secure an advantageous position by seeking a court-ordered dissolution does 
not mean that the petition has been sought in bad faith and should be rejected); Mahler, supra note 
18. That being said, although the Chancery Court has not provided clear guidance on how to de-
termine whether a deadlock is manufactured, and has even appeared to poke holes in the bad faith 
defense (by noting, for example, that a petitioner’s desire to gain an advantage through dissolution 
is inconsequential), it has generally recognized that the bad faith defense is a legitimate defense to 
petitions for dissolution. See McKinney-Ringham, 1998 WL 1188035, at *5; Arthur Treacher’s 
Fish & Chips, Inc. v. Ft. Lauderdale, Inc., 386 A.2d 1162, 1167 (Del. Ch. May 10, 1978). 
 135 In re Goodman, 200 A.D.2d at 670–71 (rejecting consideration of petitioner’s bad faith by 
reasoning that “the underlying reason for the dissension is of no moment”). 
 136 See Wilford, No. 15-856-BC, at *6; (citing Vila v. BVWebTies, LLC, No. Civ. A. 4308-
VCS, 2010 WL 3866098, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2010)). 
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mission that Elting had at times acted improperly to seek a forced sale.137 
Further, as discussed supra, despite their best efforts to do so, courts faced 
with interpreting the bad faith defense in Section 273 and Section 18-802 
cases have failed to establish a cognizable, portable method for determining 
whether an apparent deadlock has been manufactured in bad faith and have 
even appeared to waiver on whether a petitioner’s motives are pertinent at 
all.138 If these cases are any indication—and there is no reason to think they 
are not—the likelihood that courts dealing with the bad faith defense in fu-
ture Section 226 actions will fare any better appears to be scant.139 As it 
happens, even when a court has expressly considered the bad faith defense 
and agreed to investigate the motives underlying an apparent deadlock, it 
has, in most of those cases, provided threadbare guidance for how to deter-
mine whether an impasse is genuine or manufactured.140 Although the type 
of analysis exemplified in Vila v. BVWebTies LLC (which Wilford v. Coltea 
characterized as a consideration of factors such as “circumstantial evidence 
of intent”) is potentially useful, such modes of inquiry still fall short of 
providing a workable roadmap for future courts assessing the bad faith de-
fense in Section 226 actions.141 
Furthermore, despite the fact that the Chancery Court in the TransPer-
fect case implied that allegations of bad faith could constitute a legitimate 
defense in certain circumstances, it simultaneously managed to cast doubt 
upon whether those circumstances could ever exist and appeared to shy 
away from wanting to address Shawe’s allegations of a manufactured dead-
                                                                                                                           
 137 See In re Shaw, 2015 WL 4874733, at *28; In re McKinney-Ringham, 1998 WL 118035, 
at *5 (evincing seemingly contradictory reasoning in its discussion of the bad faith defense in 
holding that the court could deny a dissolution petition upon a finding of a manufactured dead-
lock, but nevertheless stating that for a party to seek a dissolution action only after concluding that 
such an action could lead to a beneficial result does not indicate that the deadlock was manufac-
tured). 
 138 See supra notes 106–123 and accompanying text. 
 139 See In re Shaw, 2015 WL 4874733, at *28 (acknowledging that allegations of a manufac-
tured deadlock constitute a valid defense yet omitting an explanation for how to determine wheth-
er a deadlock is manufactured or genuine); In re McKinney-Ringham, 1998 WL 118035, at *5 
(holding that the court could deny a dissolution petition upon a finding of a manufactured dead-
lock, but nevertheless stating that for a party to seek a dissolution action only after concluding that 
such an action could lead to a beneficial result does not indicate that the deadlock was manufac-
tured). 
 140 See supra notes 106–123 and accompanying text. The Wilford court did provide some 
guidance when it cited to Vila as an example of a decision that considered “circumstantial evi-
dence of intent” along with “design and timing” and “credibility” of the petitioner in assessing 
whether a deadlock was manufactured. See Wilford, No. 15-856-BC, at *6 (citing Vila, 2010 WL 
3866098, at *8). 
 141 See Wilford, No. 15-856-BC, at *6 (citing Vila, 2010 WL 3866098, at *8) (discussing the 
factors considered by the Vila court in assessing the bad faith defense); Vila, 2010 WL 3866098, 
at *7 (finding that a deadlock had not been manufactured). 
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lock head-on.142 Indeed, the court’s reasoning for determining that the dead-
lock was genuine and not manufactured appears somewhat self-
contradictory: the court acknowledged that Elting had indeed “acted im-
properly at times” to “pursue the goal” of being “bought out” yet subse-
quently concluded that it could not be disputed that the facts demonstrate 
“genuine, good faith divisions” between Shawe and Elting.143 The TransPer-
fect court’s reluctance to acquiesce to Shawe’s allegations that Elting had 
manufactured the deadlock, despite its admission that Elting acted “improp-
erly” in furtherance of her goal of being “bought out,” demonstrates the bad 
faith defense’s inherent elusiveness.144 
An explicit statement that allegations of manufactured deadlocks do 
not constitute valid defenses in Section 226 actions would do away with the 
need for courts to examine the nebulous question of whether a petitioner 
conjured a deadlock.145 It would also save courts from the awkwardness of 
                                                                                                                           
 142 See In re Shawe, 2015 WL 4874733, at *28. In its 104-page decision, the Chancery Court 
dedicated only one paragraph to its rejection of Shawe’s bad faith defense: 
I reject Shawe’s defense that Elting has manufactured the deadlocks described above 
simply to facilitate a sale of the Company and liquidate her interest in it. The record 
does show that Elting has expressed a desire to be bought out and acted improperly 
at times to pursue that goal. It also shows that she and Shawe both engaged in “mu-
tual hostaging” over specific [decisions]. That said, this is not a case where a direc-
tor has “sought to create a deadlock by refusing to consider any issue” until the 
deadlock is resolved. It cannot be legitimately disputed in my judgment that the mat-
ters discussed above reflect genuine, good faith divisions between Shawe and Elting 
and of a fundamental and systemic nature over how the Company should be man-
aged. 
Id.; see also Francis Pileggi, Chancery Appoints Custodian to Break Deadlock of Profitable Corpora-
tion, DEL. CORP. & COM. LITIG. BLOG (Aug. 28, 2015), https://www.delawarelitigation.
com/2015/08/articles/chancery-court-updates/chancery-appoints-custodian-to-break-deadlock-of-
profitable-corporation/ [https://perma.cc/L25D-7CPN] (noting the lack of clarity in the Chancery 
Court’s decision as to why the facts of the TransPerfect case differed from those of Millien, where 
the court declined to appoint a custodian in part because the facts indicated that one of the owners 
had manufactured the deadlock). 
 143 See In re Shawe, 2015 WL 4874733, at *28. In fairness, at the time the decision was writ-
ten, Chancellor Bouchard had been presiding over the TransPerfect drama for over two years, 
including a full bench trial where the intricacies of the feud between the couple were deeply ex-
plored and was thus likely well situated to make a determination as to the root causes of the dead-
lock. See generally In re Shawe, 2015 WL 4874733 (presenting a thorough conceptualization of 
the nature of the dispute between Shawe and Elting). 
 144 See In re Shawe, 2015 WL 4874733, at *28. In a sense, the Chancery Court admits that 
Elting had a hand in manufacturing the deadlock, and the fact that the Chancery Court nonetheless 
followed that admission with a conclusion that the deadlock was genuine exemplifies the unwork-
able nature of the bad faith defense in general. See id. 
 145 See Wilford, No. 15-856-BC, at *6 (citing Vila, 2010 WL 3866098, at *8). The Vila analy-
sis, which, as described by Wilford is one that looks to factors such as “circumstantial evidence of 
intent” along with “design and timing” and “credibility” of the petitioner in order to assess the 
petitioner’s motives, requires an extensive fact-finding mission on the part of the courts—a mis-
sion that would be wholly unnecessary if the courts decided to reject the viability of the bad faith 
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stretching to reject allegations of a manufactured deadlock in the face of 
facts, like those in the TransPerfect case, which suggest that the deadlock at 
issue might actually have been manufactured after all.146 Finally, a whole-
sale denouncement of the bad faith defense’s applicability to Section 226 
actions would prevent litigants like Shawe from leading the court down a 
rabbit hole exploration of personal feuds in a futile attempt to cast doubt 
upon the petitioner’s character.147 
B. Manufactured or Not, a Deadlock Is Still a Deadlock: Theoretical 
Support for Rejecting the Availability of the Bad Faith Defense 
As discussed supra, some courts have ostensibly recognized that if the 
goal of statutes authorizing judicial intervention is to rescue shareholder 
value from potential irreparable harm caused by a fifty-fifty deadlock, then 
the reason for the deadlock should not matter.148 A deadlock—whether aris-
ing out of genuine or bona fide disagreements about business decisions, 
dramatic personal feuds, or calculated, long-term tactics on the part of one 
owner to effectuate a court-ordered sale—is still a deadlock.149 This reason-
ing is sound, and provides further support for future courts to explicitly re-
ject the availability of the bad faith defense in Section 226 petitions.150 If 
the court is serious about using Section 226 as a last-resort mechanism to 
prevent deadlocks from causing irreparable harm, then concerns about peti-
tioners purposefully availing themselves of the statute after having inten-
tionally manufactured the deadlock are irrelevant.151 
                                                                                                                           
defense wholesale. See id.; see also In re: McKinney-Ringham, 1998 WL 118035, at *5 (grappling 
with an argument that a petitioner had bad faith motives in seeking a court-ordered dissolution). 
 146 See In re Shawe, 2015 WL 4874733, at *28 (justifying its conclusion that Elting had not 
manufactured the deadlock by stating that the deadlock was due to genuine disagreements despite 
admitting that Elting had “acted improperly at times” to “pursue the goal” of being “bought out”); 
see also Fisk Ventures, 2009 WL 73957, at * 6 (noting that the fact that petitioner stands to secure 
an advantageous position by seeking a court-ordered dissolution does not mean that the petition 
has been sought in bad faith and should be rejected). 
 147 In re Shawe, 2015 WL 4874733, at *1 (noting the “painstaking detail” with which the 
court had to explain the intricacies of the personal feud between Shawe and Elting). 
 148 See Feinberg, Index No. 3120–11, at *4–5 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cty. Sept. 6, 2013); Mahler, 
supra note 18 (noting certain New York cases cited in Feinberg that have rejected the bad faith 
defense in connection with Section 1104 of New York’s Business Corporation Law). 
 149 See In re Goodman, 200 A.D.2d at 670–71 (rejecting consideration of petitioner’s bad 
faith by reasoning that “the underlying reason for the dissension is of no moment”). 
 150 See In re Gordon & Weiss, 32 A.D.2d 279, 279 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969) (rejecting the no-
tion that the alleged bad faith of a petitioner seeking dissolution under Section 1104 of New 
York’s Business Corporation Law is relevant). 
 151 See id. This position does not deny that such strategic manipulation might occur, but rather 
that such behavior is inevitable and inapposite to the court’s determination as to whether a dead-
lock exists and whether that deadlock poses an irreparable threat to the business. See id.; Claudia 
M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, Shotguns and Deadlocks, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 143, 149 (2011) 
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1. The Theoretical Conundrum that Results When Allegations of Bad Faith 
Manufacturing Are Considered 
The argument for rejecting the availability of the bad faith defense en-
tirely is strengthened when one considers how the situation might devolve 
after the court, having concluded that a deadlock has been manufactured 
(i.e., accepting a respondent’s bad faith defense), declines to appoint a cus-
todian and dismisses the case.152 This is a gamble.153 On the one hand, the 
gamble might play out as the court may have hoped, with the petitioner 
coming back to the “bargaining table” after having his long-term strategy of 
a court-ordered exit option defeated, ready to continue business in a profes-
sional manner.154 As unrealistic as this sounds, for a court to determine that 
                                                                                                                           
(advocating an increased use of negotiated “Shotgun” mechanisms between owners of closely-
held corporations and other joint ventures as a way to proactively resolve future deadlock issues, 
yet recognizing that there will always be a “residual risk” that one owner might “manufacture a 
deadlock and strategically trigger the Shotgun provision in order to buy out the disadvantaged 
party at a low price”); see also Landeo & Spier, supra note 72 (defining the “Shotgun” mecha-
nism). This theoretical argument that the motives underlying the apparent deadlock are irrelevant 
to judicial intervention proceedings dovetails with the more practical argument already described 
previously, that inquiries into the petitioner’s underlying motives for seeking the petition requires 
a great deal of fact-sensitive investigation, and a determination that a petitioner did indeed manu-
facture a deadlock in bad faith requires the court to rely heavily on circumstantial evidence and 
generous inferences. See supra notes 106–123 and accompanying text. Though not specifically 
addressed in this Part, the argument in favor of abandoning the inquiry into the petitioner’s mo-
tives (i.e., the argument for abolishing the bad faith defense) appears to be supported by the plain 
language of Section 226, which only asks whether deadlock exists and, in the case of Section 
226(a)(2), whether a deadlock between directors has resulted in the company being faced with an 
irreparable harm. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a)(2) (2011). There is no statutory requirement 
that the ultimate deadlock must not have been the goal of the petitioner. See id. 
 152 See L. CORP. OFFICERS & DIRECTORS: INDEMNIFICATION & INS. § 1:22, Westlaw (data-
base updated Nov. 2016) (pointing out that often, director deadlock “may paralyze the normal and 
established operations” of the business and concerns relating to “public policy” may guide the 
court’s hand towards dissolution or appointment of a custodian). 
 153 See Post-Trial Brief for Respondent at 70–78, In re Shawe, 2015 WL 4874733 (arguing 
that the court should reject Elting’s petition for the appointment of a custodian because of the fact 
that Elting had intentionally sought to create and exacerbate internal conflict and deadlock by 
refusing to consider any business decisions pertaining to hiring, acquisitions, true-ups, etc., and 
implying that were the court to accept his argument and decline to appoint a custodian with the 
power to sell the corporation, the business would continue to be profitable and that he and Elting 
would find an alternative way to resolve their feud); see also Mahler, supra note 18 (discussing 
the bad faith defense in relation to New York’s Business Corporation Law, Section 1104-a). Inter-
estingly, a comment left by a reader on the webpage containing Peter Mahler’s article Is Bad Faith 
a Defense in Deadlock Dissolution Proceedings, poses this same question (asking what would 
happen if a court were to accept a party’s bad faith defense), yet nonetheless states that the reader 
agrees that bad faith should constitute an acceptable defense. See Mahler, supra note 18. 
 154 See Mahler, supra note 18. This scenario is caveated by the reality that a court could also 
choose to accept a bad faith defense and at the same time, decline to dismiss the Section 226 ac-
tion in its entirety. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(b). It is entirely possible that the court could 
find that the petitioner had acted in bad faith to manufacture a deadlock, yet recognize the conun-
drum that the owners or directors’ relationship may, as a result of the petitioner’s strategy, none-
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an owner has manufactured a deadlock in bad faith is, in a sense, tanta-
mount to concluding that because the petitioner had simply “feigned” dis-
sension and deadlock, the petitioner’s relationship with his or her co-owner 
is actually not irreconcilable.155 Is it realistic to assume that just because a 
deadlock was created with the purpose of achieving a forced sale, the dis-
sension is a sham and the issues between the owners are actually easily re-
solvable?156 This theoretical conundrum would be mooted if Delaware 
courts decided to treat Section 226 as a complete no-fault statute and em-
braced the position that manufactured or not, a deadlock is a deadlock.157 
2. A Word of Warning: Treating Section 226 as a No-Fault Statute Requires 
a Full Commitment 
Treating Section 226 as a pure no-fault statute would indeed resolve 
practical and theoretical quandaries that inevitably result when the court is 
required to determine whether a petitioner has manufactured a deadlock in 
bad faith.158 Yet for courts to endorse this approach of concerning them-
selves only with whether a deadlock exists requires a considerable com-
mitment, and in order for this method to function properly, courts must go 
“all the way” in their treatment of Section 226 as a complete no-fault stat-
ute.159 This requires Delaware courts to go a step beyond Feinberg v. Sil-
                                                                                                                           
theless have reached a point of “no return” where they are incapable of simply returning to work 
together. See In re Shawe, 2015 WL 4874733, at *31 (reasoning that leaving Shawe and Elting “to 
their own devices” was not an option). In that case, the court could take a different approach, such 
as appointing a third director to act as a tie breaker in the deadlocked business decisions at issue, 
as opposed to appointing a custodian with the power to sell the business. See id. 
 155 See In re Shawe, 2015 WL 4874733, at *28 (finding that, despite evidence that Elting had 
pursued a course of action to achieve a court-ordered sale, the deadlock was genuine and not man-
ufactured). For instance, if the Chancery Court in the TransPerfect case decided to accept Shawe’s 
bad faith defense and concluded that the alleged deadlock had in fact been fabricated, would that 
have done anything to resolve the dispute at the heart of the litigation, or would the corporation 
still likely be threatened with irreparable harm? See id. 
 156 See supra notes 153–154 and accompanying text. If the court accepts a bad faith defense 
and dismisses the Section 226 action wholesale, and the defeated petitioner miraculously returns 
to his/her position ready to carry on the business, then the court’s gamble pays off. See supra 
notes 153–154 and accompanying text. If, on the other hand, the roulette wheel lands on the alter-
native, and perhaps more likely scenario, where the petitioner and objector (having just walked out 
of a lengthy litigation battle) are nevertheless unable to resolve the deadlock that the court has 
found to be fabricated, then the court loses the bet. See supra notes 153–154 and accompanying 
text. 
 157 See In re Goodman, 200 A.D.2d at 670–71; Mahler, supra note 18 (noting that certain 
New York cases have treated the dissolution statute as a “no-fault statute”). 
 158 See supra notes 106–123 and accompanying text (discussing cases evincing the difficulties 
inherent in determining whether a deadlock is genuine or manufactured). 
 159 See In re Goodman, 200 A.D.2d at 670–71. The “approach” referred to here is one that 
embraces the perspective set forth in the New York appellate cases cited in the Feinberg decision, 
which reasoned that the New York business dissolution statute does not solicit an investigation 
2018] Bad Faith Should Not Be a Defense in § 226 Actions 757 
verberg, which could be read to have concluded that the New York corpo-
rate dissolution statute could be treated as a partial no-fault statute: Fein-
berg tried to “harmonize[]” cases where the court had inquired into the peti-
tioner’s motives (considering fault relevant) with those that had refused to 
do so (treating it as a no-fault statute).160 The instability of the Feinberg 
reasoning becomes apparent under close scrutiny: it states that finding of 
fault is irrelevant where there is “no real dispute” that the deadlock is genu-
ine (“Situation X”) but that an inquiry into the “intent” of a petitioner is 
warranted in order to determine whether the deadlock is “feigned” (“Situa-
tion Y”).161 Although technically sound when viewed in a vacuum, this rea-
soning becomes circular when applied in practice, when the pivotal ques-
tion faced by the court is the threshold issue of whether the deadlock is 
genuine or artificial (i.e., whether to classify a deadlock as Situation X or 
Situation Y), which requires an inquiry into potential bad faith motives of 
one of the parties, which is tantamount to a finding of fault.162 In reality, it 
is impossible to arrive at the Situation X option of treating the dissolution 
statute as a no fault statute, without making the threshold determination of 
whether the deadlock is genuine (which brings the court back to Situation 
Y).163 The circular logic that inevitably results when courts are asked to as-
                                                                                                                           
into the reason underlying an apparent deadlock and thus that “ascribing fault” to either party to 
the action is irrelevant. See Feinberg, Index No. 3120-11, at 2–4. Feinberg did not commit to 
treating N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1104 as a no fault statue; instead, it tried to split the baby and 
reconcile cases that had done so with cases that had not. See Feinberg, Index No. 3120-11, at 8; 
Mahler, supra note 18. 
 160 See Feinberg, Index No. 3120-11, at *8; Mahler, supra note 18. Although it is admittedly 
unlikely that Delaware courts adjudicating a Section 226 action would look to New York cases 
addressing Section 1104 of New York’s Business Corporation Law, the point here is that if Dela-
ware courts do move towards treating Section 226 as a no fault statute, they should be ready to 
commit fully to that approach (reason being that attempting to reconcile the countervailing ap-
proaches of treating Section 226 as a no fault statute on the one hand versus agreeing to accept the 
bad faith defense and inquire into the motives underlying a Section 226 petition on the other inevi-
tably results in the court needing to adopt a circular, or even contradictory conclusion, as it did in 
Feinberg). See Feinberg, Index No. 3120-11, at *8. 
 161 See Feinberg, Index No. 3120-11, at *8. The logic of the court in Feinberg is technically 
sound if indeed it could be ascertained as an inexorable truth that a given deadlock is genuine, but 
the reasoning becomes problematic when the actual task of the court is characterized as proving 
that the deadlock is genuine in the first place. See id. 
 162 See id. The Feinberg decision, although analytically impressive, is still of little help for 
cases where the “fault” is the act itself of creating a deadlock. See id. Imagine a scenario where 
party A decided that she wanted to force a sale of the company, but knew that Party B would ob-
ject: Party A begins to take actions aimed at deteriorating the relationship and creating deadlock 
and dissension, and as a result, the relationship indeed breaks down and the parties’ working rela-
tionship suffers and business decisions are deadlocked. Deadlock actually exists, and thus accord-
ing to Feinberg, a finding of fault is unnecessary, and yet Feinberg also states that in this scenario, 
“the . . . intent for creating the deadlock is nevertheless relevant,” so a finding of fault is actually 
relevant even in instances where the Feinberg analysis would hold that it is not. See id. 
 163 See id. 
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sess allegations that a party has manufactured a deadlock would be avoided 
by an unequivocal commitment to treating Section 226 as a no-fault statute, 
and declaring outright that when faced with a petitioner seeking judicial 
intervention, the only question is if the stockholders/directors are in a state 
of deadlock, ignoring how or why the deadlock arose.164 
3. Looking to No-Fault Divorce Statutes to Support the Proposition That 
Section 226 Does Not Solicit a Finding of Fault 
Those hesitant to adopt the approach of treating Section 226 as a no-
fault statute and thereby abolishing the viability of the bad faith defense 
might consider the analogous field of divorce law, where the trend over the 
past half-century has been towards treating divorces as no-fault proceed-
ings.165 Until the mid-twentieth-century, someone seeking to dissolve a 
marriage would need to prove that the other spouse was guilty of commit-
ting certain acts that satisfied the “fault grounds for divorce.”166 The advent 
of no-fault divorce regimes has shifted the focus away from seeking to affix 
                                                                                                                           
 164 See In re Goodman, 200 A.D.2d at 670–71; Mahler, supra note 18 (discussing the notion 
that certain New York cases have treated the New York law governing business dissolution as a 
“no-fault statute”). 
 165 See John H. Matheson & R. Kevin Maler, A Simple Statutory Solution to Minority Oppres-
sion in the Closely Held Business, 91 MINN. L. REV. 657, 692 (2007) (discussing the fact that state 
laws governing business dissolutions have not yet recognized the concept of “no-fault divorce” 
and proposing a “model statute” that would operate as “a kind of no-fault divorce” by giving mi-
nority shareholders the option of liquidity in the absence of a pre-negotiated buy-sell agreement); 
see also CARMODY-WAIT 2D New York Practice with Forms § 114:74, Westlaw (database updat-
ed Mar. 2017) (detailing the 2010 update to New York divorce law, allowing divorces on no-fault 
grounds); Ellman & Lohr, supra note 28 (describing the shift to a no-fault divorce system and 
rejecting claims that no-fault divorce regimes have contributed to “societal-ills”); Kristine Cordier 
Karnezis, Annotation, Fault as Consideration in Alimony, Spousal Support, or Property Division 
Awards Pursuant to No-Fault Divorce, 86 A.L.R.3d 1116, § 2a (1978) (analyzing cases that con-
sider whether fault can still be considered in divorces on “no-fault” grounds for the purpose of 
property-division). But see Peter Nash Swisher, Reassessing Fault Factors in No-Fault Divorce, 
31 FAM. L.Q. 269, 271 (1997) (questioning the success of the no-fault divorce “regime” in the 
United States); Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 79, 79–80 (1991) (arguing that despite the hope in the 1970’s that a shift towards a no-fault 
divorce-law system would extinguish the need for divorce proceedings to ignite interpersonal 
animosities and would “enhance respect for the law,” no-fault divorce regimes have led to an 
increase in divorce rates and “inequities in the economic consequences of divorce”). 
 166 See Allen M. Parkman, Reforming Divorce Reform, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 379, 379, 
380–81 (providing an overview of the shift from fault to no-fault divorce statutes). Acknowledg-
ing the flaws of this seemingly archaic requirement that a petitioner seeking divorce prove that 
their spouse was committing a wrong, all states have, since the 1970s, either adopted no-fault 
grounds for divorce instead of fault grounds, or have added the option of the no-fault divorce in 
conjunction with their previous fault-ground laws. Id. at 380. Common wrongs pointed to under 
fault regimes were “adultery, desertion, or cruelty.” Id. 
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blame to one of the parties during divorce proceedings.167 Said another way, 
no-fault divorce regimes have removed the requirement that the spouse 
seeking the divorce be “innocent” and that the other spouse is “guilty of 
marital misconduct.”168 Similarly, no-fault divorce regimes extinguish the 
option for the spouse objecting to the divorce to point to the petitioner’s 
“misconduct” as a defense, because unlike the previous fault regimes, there 
is no longer a requirement that the petitioner be deemed “innocent.”169 
This shift evinces policy support for extinguishing the defense in Sec-
tion 226 actions that allege that a petitioner has manufactured a deadlock in 
order to seek a court-ordered sale (i.e., closing the door on the bad faith de-
fense in Section 226 proceedings).170 Delaware courts need look no further 
than the evolution of modern divorce law in their own state.171 Indeed, 
judges in Delaware divorce proceedings are prohibited from considering 
evidence of fault or wrongdoing when deciding whether to grant a divorce 
and whether to order alimony payments.172 State legislatures and courts 
alike, in all fifty states, have recognized that if a marriage is damaged be-
yond repair, legal separation is permitted and an affirmative finding of fault 
on the part of one spouse is unnecessary.173 Similarly, if the relationship 
                                                                                                                           
 167 See Karnezis, supra note 165 (noting the reasoning that no-fault regimes do away with the 
need to illuminate “ugly details of conduct” in divorce proceedings). 
 168 See Ellman & Lohr, supra note 28, at 722. 
 169 See id. at 730 (noting that under fault regimes, alleging misconduct such as adultery on the 
part of the petitioner was a valid defense, because such regimes required that the petitioner was 
“innocent” and that the other spouse was at fault). 
 170 See Matheson & Maler, supra note 165, at 699 (noting that because state corporate law has 
not evolved to the point of allowing no-fault business divorces, minority business owners are 
required to offer proof of “oppressive conduct of the other party”). Although Matheson and 
Maler’s article supports a type of no-fault divorce relationship in order to do away with the re-
quirement that a minority owner seeking liquidity prove fault of the opposing owner, recognizing 
statutes such as Section 226 as no-fault statutes would also allow courts to refuse to consider alle-
gations made by the party seeking to prevent judicial intervention of bad faith on the part of the 
petitioner seeking the appointment of a custodian (or a court-ordered sale/dissolution). See id.; see 
also Ellman & Lohr, supra note 28, at 722–23. Admittedly, the analogy between divorce law and 
petitions for the appointment of a custodian under Section 226 is far from perfect yet the common 
ground on which both areas of law are based is easily recognizable. Compare In re Goodman, 200 
A.D.2d at 670–71 (ascribing fault to one of the parties is unnecessary in corporate dissolution 
proceeding), with Schiffer v. Schiffer, 930 N.Y.S. 2d 827, 829 (2011) (summarizing the New 
York State no-fault divorce statute, which simply asks whether the relationship between spouses 
has “broken down irretrievably”). 
 171 See Amy Castillo, Adultery in Delaware: Does Cheating Affect Alimony? DIVORCENET, 
https://www.divorcenet.com/resources/divorce/spousal-support/cheating-spouse-alimony-delaware.
htm [https://perma.cc/K4YA-CMZK] (noting that although some states still allow fault-based 
divorces, Delaware is a complete no-fault state, where divorces will be granted on the grounds of 
an irretrievable breakdown of relations, and that judges are “explicitly forbidden from considering 
adultery, or any other kind of marital misconduct, when considering whether to award alimony”). 
 172 See id. 
 173 See Ellman & Lohr, supra note 28, at 722–23. 
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between 50% owners of a corporation has decayed past the point where 
reconciliation is a viable outcome, there is a cognizable argument that the 
underlying facts that caused the resulting deadlock—even if those facts in-
dicate that one party consciously aggravated the situation to cause the 
breakdown—are irrelevant.174 
CONCLUSION 
The notion that a 50% business owner might attempt to manufacture a 
deadlock in order to obtain a court-ordered sale over the objections of their 
co-owner presents a legitimate concern. As such, it is hardly surprising that 
respondents to corporate deadlock proceedings, such as Phillip Shawe in the 
TransPerfect case, have raised the specter of the opposing party’s bad faith 
in the hope of preventing a forced sale. With that said, the challenge inher-
ent in assessing allegations that a deadlock between stockholders or direc-
tors was manufactured and thus not “genuine” creates a significant burden 
for the courts. Furthermore, the text of statutes such as Section 226, which 
allow for court-ordered sales, require only that a deadlock exists and that 
the company be faced with resultant harm. There is no subsidiary require-
ment in Section 226 (or Sections 273 or 18-802 for that matter) that says 
deadlock must not have been the ultimate goal of the petitioner. In fact, the 
maladies inherent in allowing consideration of the bad faith defense to judi-
cial intervention in such actions outweigh the potential benefits that the 
                                                                                                                           
 174 See Castillo, supra note 171 (describing divorce law in Delaware). At this point, the reader 
may have noticed an “elephant in the room” not specifically addressed by the argument section of 
this Note: if the aforementioned considerations weigh in favor of abandoning recognition of the 
bad faith defense in Section 226 actions, do not those same considerations point to the conclusion 
that courts should also close the door on the bad faith defense in Section 273 and Section 18-802 
proceedings? See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 226, 273; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-802. The sim-
plest answer to that question is a resounding “yes.” See supra notes 124–174 and accompanying 
text. That being said, as a practical matter, Delaware courts have rarely explicitly considered the 
bad faith defense in conjunction with Section 226 actions, whereas the doctrine has received ex-
plicit treatment in numerous Section 273 and Section 18-802 cases. See, e.g., Vila 2010 WL 
3866098, at *7 (discussing the bad faith defense in the context of an LLC); In re Bermor, Inc., No. 
VC 8401-VCL, 2015 WL 554861, at * 3–4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 9, 2016) (same); Arthur Treacher’s Fish 
& Chips, Inc. v. Ft. Lauderdale, Inc., 386 A.2d 1162, 1167 (Del. Ch. May 10, 1978) (allowing a 
defense for dissolution pursuant to Title 8, Section 273 of the Delaware General Corporation Law). 
As such, the door is open right now for courts to recognize the doctrine’s problematic nature as 
evinced by its uncertain treatment in Section 273 and Section 18-802 cases and start out on the 
right foot in its treatment of the bad faith defense in the Section 226 context. See supra notes 106–
123 and accompanying text. Said another way, the fact that this specific issue has rarely received 
explicit treatment in Section 226 cases gives the courts an opportunity to take a new position on 
the bad faith defense in the Section 226 context, after which courts assessing subsequent Section 
273 and Section 18-802 cases could follow. See supra notes 106–123 and accompanying text 
(discussing Delaware cases that have grappled with the bad faith defense in Section 273 and Sec-
tion18-802 proceedings). 
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availability of the defense confers on objecting business owners. Although 
Delaware courts have routinely allowed parties to employ the bad faith de-
fense in Section 273 and Section 18-802 cases, they have rarely addressed 
the issue directly in actions brought under Section 226. Accordingly, courts 
should take advantage of the minimal precedent addressing the bad faith 
defense in Section 226 actions to take an affirmative stance against the de-
fense in Section 226 actions going forward. Such a stance would abolish the 
need for courts to grapple with identifying the specific reasons underlying 
corporate deadlocks. Furthermore, this would eradicate the conundrum 
faced by courts that endeavor to draw an abstract line distinguishing manu-
factured deadlocks from those that are genuine. 
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